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Abstract 
Increasing numbers of alerts produced by network intrusion detection 
systems (NIDS) have burdened the job of security analysts especially in 
identifying and responding to them. The tasks of exploring and analysing large 
quantities of communication network security data are also difficult. This thesis 
studied the application of visualisation in combination with alerts classifier to 
make the exploring and understanding of network security alerts data faster and 
easier. The prototype software, NSAViz, has been developed to visualise and to 
provide an intuitive presentation of the network security alerts data using 
interactive 3D visuals with an integration of a false alert classifier. The needs 
analysis of this prototype was based on the suggested needs of network 
security analyst's tasks as seen in the literatures. The prototype software 
incorporates various projections of the alert data in 3D displays. The overview 
was plotted in a 3D plot named as "time series 3D AlertGraph" which was an 
extension of the 2D histographs into 3D. The 3D AlertGraph was effectively 
summarised the alerts data and gave the overview of the network security 
status. Filtering, drill-down and playback of the alerts at variable speed were 
incorporated to strengthen the analysis. Real-time visual observation was also 
included. 
To identify true alerts from all alerts represents the main task of the 
network security analyst. This prototype software was integrated with a false 
alert classifier using a classification tree based on C4.5 classification algorithm 
to classify the alerts into true and false. Users can add new samples and edit 
the existing classifier training sample. The classifier performance was measured 
using k-fold cross-validation technique. The results showed the classifier was 
able to remove noise in the visualisation, thus making the pattern of the true 
alerts to emerge. It also highlighted the true alerts in the visualisation. 
Finally, a user evaluation was conducted to find the usability problems in 
the tool and to measure its effectiveness. The feed backs showed the tools had 
successfully helped the task of the security analyst and increased the security 
iii 
awareness in their supervised network. From this research, the task of exploring 
and analysing a large amount of network security data becomes easier and the 
true attacks can be identified using the prototype visualisation tools. 
Visualisation techniques and false alert classification are helpful in exploring 
and analysing network security data. 
Keywords 
Network Security Visualization, Visualization for Cybersecurity, 
Visualization for Computer Security, Information Visualization, Intrusion 
Detection Alert Visualization, False Alert Classification, Human Computer 
Interaction 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
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1.1 Introduction 
Internet security threats are fast-growing. According to the Computing 
Technology Industry Association (CompTIA), the number of organisations 
reporting they have suffered internet-based attacks increased significantly for 
the third consecutive year [1]. Almost every day, there will be network attacks or 
the spreading of viruses or worms in the Internet. Symantec's Threat Team 
reported in their biannual report on Internet Threats that secret networks were 
recruiting more than 30,000 personal computers each day to spread spam and 
viruses in the first 6-month of 2004 [2]. 
To detect these threats, network administrators normally rely on an 
intrusion detection system [3]. The Intrusion detection system (IOS) is a system 
that checks network traffic and warns the network administrator of possible 
intrusions and network attacks. The alerting is usually undertaken using e-mail 
messages and log files. However, the 10S has also some drawbacks. For 
example, they are known to produce many alerts and at the same time high 
rates of false alarms [4, 5]. 
The numerous alerts produced by all intrusion detection systems have 
increased the tasks of network security analysts. Network security analysts 
need to analyse these alerts and identify the true alerts among them. 
Considering the massive volume and the ''textual form" of these alerts, to 
perform security analyst tasks will need a lot of time and skill. 
Burdened with many alerts and logs to analyse, the network security 
analysts or network administrators have to identify the true attacks as early as 
possible. Early response to true alerts and not wasting time on false ones may 
protect a company from losses caused by malicious attacks. Using visualisation 
to display the alerts in a creative way can help the security analysts or network 
administrators to understand, explore, and respond to the numerous alerts 
faster. 
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1.2 Security Visualisation 
Giving a visual perspective of network security data has been the aim of 
many researchers in this area. The success of visualisation in fields such as 
medicine, weather and atmospheric study, archaeology, chemistry, financial 
analysis and airport security motivates further research in this area. Security 
visualisation is an area of research drawn from information visualisation. 
According to Card, Mackinlay and Shneiderman [6], information visualisation is 
'the use of computer-supported, interactive, visual representations of data to 
amplify cognition~ 
Visualisation tools are a way to transfer information from a set of data 
through images. The visual perspective of data allows users to understand 
great amounts of data in a shorter time [7]. The network security data includes 
Tcpdump traffic files, network event log files and event logs produced by an 
intrusion detection system. Thus, security visualisation is an area where 
researchers try to give meaningful visual images from seas of network security 
data. 
The main objective of security visualisation is to make exploring huge 
security related logs or network traffic faster. It is to view abnormal patterns of 
network traffic that are related to intrusions. With visualisation, the network 
security analyst can explore the information or specific properties of a network 
attack better [8]. According to Erbacher [9], visualisation techniques allow the 
network administrator to identify the behaviour of users connecting to a network 
with bad motives. 
1.3 Advantages of the Visual Method 
The advantages of using a visual image for huge and large data are 
indisputable. An old proverb says that "a picture says more than a thousand 
words". Yin [10] said that human mind has fast visual processing in comparison 
to data mining powers. 
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Visualisation also offers a method for seeing the unseen. It creates visual 
metaphors so that information is represented as visual symbols. Visual 
metaphors also allow efficient knowledge extraction and help one to gain more 
insights in comparison to the information presented in textual form [11]. 
Ball [12] suggested that to have an effective visualisation, "one should 
take advantage of the parallel and pre-attentive nature of visual-spatial cognitive 
modality~ Researchers in psychology have shown that humans can process 
pictures, which is a parallel process, faster than text, which is a serial process. 
Also, it is easier for humans to remember as humans think and learn visually 
[13]. 
With fast-growing threats in the Internet and huge amounts of data to be 
analysed, the critical missions of network security analysts and network 
administrators are to identify threats faster and to react quickly to them [14]. A 
visualisation tool can be an effective way to explore vast amounts of network 
security data. 
1.4 Statement of the Problem 
Increasing numbers of alerts produced by network intrusion detection 
systems (NIDS) have increased the job of security analysts to identify the true 
alert among them. In a large-scale network, there may be millions of alerts or 
alarms each day. These alerts are normally presented in "text form" and most of 
them are false positive alerts [5). Considering the massive volume of alerts 
received, it is impossible for a human being to deal with all of them manually. 
This becomes even worse as there is a lack of experts to identify the true alerts 
among the thousands of alerts received. 
This thesis researches the use of visualisation to represent network 
security attack data for effective monitoring, exploration and analysis. To prove 
this, prototype visualisation software has been developed to visualise the 
network security attack data effectively. A classification tree algorithm has been 
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studied based on the C4.5 classification algorithm with visualisation techniques 
to identify true alerts. Lastly, a user evaluation has been conducted to evaluate 
the effectiveness and usability problems of this prototype. 
The prototype visualisation software visualised the communication 
network security data with various displays in 3D allowing filtering, drill-down 
and animation to give visual insight of the data. The displays were a 3D 
AlertGraph, scatter plot, parallel coordinates plot, timeline view, plane view and 
geographical view. In the visualisation software, data such as alerts and 
network hosts were displayed as objects that gave abstract information 
regarding its value. Glyphs, lines, colour-coding and visual positioning were 
normally used to give abstract information regarding the attacks. 
In this research, network security data produced by Snort [15) was used 
as the source of the data and the prototype was designed to use data 
specifically from Snort. To use data from different types of IDS is another topic 
of research which includes data fusion. The scope of this research is limited to 
the study and analysis of the alerts produced by Snort IDS using visualisation 
and classification techniques to uncover the network security threats. 
To solve the research problem, answers to the following questions was 
sought: 
1. How should network security information be visualised to aid user 
analysis of network attacks? 
2. Does the proposed visualisation tool effectively inform user 
regarding the security status of the supervised network? 
3. Is the visualisation tool scalable to receive huge amounts of network 
security data and representing them? 
4. Is the user able to recognise the patterns related to network security 
attacks? 
5. Is interactivity with the visualisation tool sufficiently addressed Le 
drill down, IP address etc.? 
6. Does the visualisation tool inform users the host being attacked and 
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the probable attackers? 
1.5 Thesis Contributions 
This thesis proposes solutions for the problems outlined in the previous 
section, and provides the following contributions. 
• Designing novel 3D visuals of network security alerts for better 
viewing and understanding of the data. The designs were the time 
series 3D AlertGraph, the alerts scatter plot view and the alerts 
timeline view. 
• Using a classification tree algorithm based on C4.S classification 
algorithm with visualisation to help users to identify true alerts. 
• Using animation, real-time monitoring, interaction, user-friendly 
graphical user interface, drill-down and filter with the visualisation 
to get better insight of the network security alerts data. 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is organised into seven chapters. The first chapter introduces 
the research problems, gives a statement of the problem and the research 
conducted. The scope of this research is also explained. 
The second chapter introduces background knowledge in information 
visualisation, visualisation techniques, network security data, and related work 
by other researchers in network security visualisation. 
The third chapter explains the need analysis, the fulfilling needs, the 
visualisation design and the details of the visualisation features. The justification 
of the design is further discussed. 
The fourth chapter explains the use of a classification tree algorithm in 
the visualisation prototype. The choice, method, performance and accuracy of 
the classifier are discussed. 
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The fifth chapter considers on the simulation framework and the dataset 
used. Then, some of the results from the attack examples and the patterns of 
the known attacks are shown. 
The sixth chapter explains the current practice of user evaluation. The 
evaluation method and result are then explained. Conclusions and the 
suggested improvements are discussed. 
The last chapter layouts the conclusions, research contributions and 
suggestions for future work. 
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Chapter 2: Network Security and Information 
Visualisation 
Page 8 
This chapter gives background information regarding network security 
and information visualisation. The objectives and the common techniques in 
network attack are explained. Then, the use of information visualisation in 
network security to unveil network attacks is discussed. 
2.1 Understanding Network Attacks and Threats 
Security threats can be in various forms and may have diverse effects. 
The attackers target might be to cause destruction, to interrupt services, to 
compromise and to steal information or resources, and to tamper or to alter 
information. The attackers, also known as hackers, create malicious programs 
and methods to accomplish their goals. Hackers will exploit weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities in the network transport protocols and in the application software 
to compromise a computer system. The hacker may also spend some time 
gathering essential information regarding a computer network before launching 
an attack. 
In information gathering, the hackers normally use the following 
techniques: 
• Port Scanner: A port scanner is a program that automatically 
detects any open port in a remote system. Port scanning is not an 
attack but is analogous to a thief looking for unlocked doors or 
windows of a house [16]. It is an attempt to identify any port that is 
opened which the attacker can access into the machine. Some of 
the available scanners are TCP scan, SYN scan and UDP scan; 
each of them having different scanning techniques. 
• Packet Sniffing: A sniffer is software that captures 'packets' that 
travel along a network [17]. The sniffer software puts the network 
interface device into a 'promiscuous' mode and captures all 
network traffic packets. By looking into the content of the packets, 
hackers can reveal valuable information such as user names, 
passwords, addresses and any information passing through the 
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internet. 
In the following sections, typical hacker techniques in launching attacks 
are explained. The objective is to give an understanding of how the hackers 
exploit the weaknesses of the internet protocol that make the network 
vulnerable. 
2.1.1 Denial of Service Attack 
A denial of service attack is a security breach of a computer system that 
does not usually result in the theft of information or other security losses. Denial 
of service attacks (DOS) will lead to the unavailability of services of the targeted 
machine. The targeted machine such as an internet service provider (ISP) 
system, online banking system, e-commence system or any web hosting 
server will be out of service. It is done by exploiting the targeted machine 
resources at the maximum rate possible and therefore crashing the system [18]. 
There are varieties of known DOS attack. Some of the famous DOS attacks are 
explained below. 
2.1.1.1 Flooding Attack 
The Flooding Attack can be categorised into SYN flooding and UDP 
flooding. SYN flooding exploits the TCP Three-Way Handshake mechanism 
[19]. The three-way handshake stages are sending SYN, receiving SYN-ACK 
and sending ACK. The attacker simply sends a large number of SYNs without 
responding to the receiver ACK. Thus, the targeted machine will have stacks of 
awaiting TCP connections. As half-open connections use system resources, the 
targeted machine will be saturated and will reject any new connections. 
UDP flooding is a DOS attack that exploits the unconnected mode of the 
UDP protocol. It creates a UDP packet storm to a single machine or to a group 
of machines in a network. Such attacks will increase network congestion, 
consume the whole network bandwidth and leaving only a tiny part or none for 
the TCP protocol. Therefore, all new connections will be rejected. 
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2.1 .1.2 Smurf Attack 
The Smurf Attack exploits the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), 
which enables users to send an echo packet to a remote host to check whether 
it is alive or not. A smurf program builds a network packet that appears to 
originate from a false address (IP spoofing) (20). The packet contains an ICMP 
ping message that is addressed to an IP broadcast address, meaning all IP 
addresses in a given network. The echo responses to the ping message are 
then sent back to the "victim" address. Many pings and resultant echoes will 
flood the network and make it unusable for real traffic. A smurf attack is also 
known as a simple Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attack. 
2.1.2 IP Spoofing 
IP Spoofing is a technique used by hackers to gain access to a computer 
system using a faked IP address (19). The technique consists of an intruder 
sending a message to a victim computer with a forged IP address that appears 
to be from a trusted host. In this case, the intruder needs to modify the packet 
header by changing the source IP address of the packet with a trusted IP 
address host. 
2.1.3 Routing Attack 
The Routing Attack is an attack that uses the Routing Information 
Protocol (RIP) in the router [21]. RIP distributes routing information within 
networks, such as shortest-paths, and advertising routes out from the local 
network. The intruder forges a RIP packet, and claims his host has the fastest 
path out of the network. All packets sent out from that network would then be 
routed through his host, where the packets could be modified or examined. The 
intruder can also use RIP to send all traffic to a particular host to be sent to the 
attacker's machine instead. 
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2.1.4 Malicious Code 
Malicious code is a program that damages the computer system. It is 
available either in the form of viruses, Trojan horses or worms. A computer virus 
is a malicious executable code that is attached to another executable program 
[22]. When the program, which the virus is attached to, is executed, the virus 
program will be secretly executed and will perform its destructive actions such 
as deleting files and causing the system to be unusable. Some viruses do not 
perform any malicious activity but instead spread themselves to other systems. 
A Trojan horse is a malicious program that disguises itself as a legitimate 
program [22]. The victim may receive an e-mail believed to be from a legitimate 
source with a pretended useful program attached. When the victim opens the 
attached program, it will instead install the virus on to the computer. The effect 
of a Trojan horse is similar to a virus and sometimes; it will install a backdoor 
program 1 that the hackers can use to gain access to the computer remotely. 
A worm is similar to a virus. The different between a worm and a virus is 
that the worm can spread itself without any help from humans [22]. As the main 
feature of a worm is the ability to reproduce itself, the major effect of worms is 
the burst of memory or network bandwidth used. This will cause web servers, 
network servers, and individual computers to stop responding. 
2.1.5 Spa m 
Spam is unsolicited e-mails or junk e-mails in the internet. The effect will 
be high consumption of the network bandwidth and will then congest the 
network traffic. Other effects from spamming can be identified as lost 
productivity, maintenance, resources and sometimes fraud. 
1 A backdoor program, also called a trapdoor, is a way of gaining access to a program, online 
service or an entire computer system. 
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2.2 Intrusion Detection Systems 
The objective of this section is to give an overview of an intrusion 
detection system. An Intrusion detection system (I OS) is a system that monitors 
network traffic for suspicious network activities and produces alerts to the 
network administrator. The 10S is analogous to a burglar alarm installed in a 
house or theft alarm installed in a car. The purpose is to defend a system by 
alerting the network administrator that the system has been compromised or 
attacked. The network administrator then should respond to the alert and make 
the necessary action to resolve the problem. The alerting may be in the form of 
e-mail messages and at the same time, the 10S will produce a series of log files 
for recording and investigation purposes. 
Basically there are two types of monitoring strategies for 10S which are 
the network intrusion detection system (NIOS), and the host intrusion detection 
system (HIOS) [23]. NIOS monitors all inbound and outbound traffic from all 
devices in a specific network. NIOS should be placed at a strategic point to 
monitor all traffic. On the other hand, HIOS is a stand-alone system running 
individually on a workstation and monitors traffic to and from its own device 
only. 
10S detect intrusion and abnormal activities either by misuse detection 
(signature detection) or by anomaly detection [23]. Signature based 10S checks 
network packets, and compares them against a signature database of known 
threats such as in antivirus software. In an anomaly-based lOS, the 10S will 
check the packet and will then compare it against a baseline. A baseline is a 
constructed base of various parameters of a normal network activity, such as 
bandwidth, protocol, port and devices used. 
Some 10S only detect intrusions and alert the network administrator. 
They do not block the intrusions but rely on humans to take the necessary 
action, based on the information they reveal. This is known as passive 10S. 
Conversely, reactive 10S is 10S that reports intrusions to the network 
administrator and proactively blocks them. 
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There are many 10S available commercially and as open source 
software. There are also some 10S systems especially built for research. This 
research used an open source lDS, Snort, to produce the intrusion alerts for the 
visualisation prototype. 
Snort is an open source network intrusion detection system which uses a 
rule-driven language that combines the benefits of signature, protocol and 
anomaly-based inspection methods. It is able to perform packet logging and 
real-time traffic analysis on IP networks. Snort claims it is the most widely used 
intrusion detection technology worldwide, and has become the de facto 
standard for the intrusion detection industry [15]. 
2.3 Information Visualisation 
2.3.1 Visualisation Terminology 
According to Webster's dictionary, visualisation is "the act or process of 
interpreting in visual terms or of putting into visible form'. In the visualisation 
field, there are terminologies such as scientific visualisation, data visualisation 
and information visualisation. Currently, there is no clear consensus on 
boundaries that distinguish them, as they share common goals, methods and 
techniques. In general, scientific visualisation deals with data that has a natural 
geometric structure (for example, MRI data, wind flows). On the other hand, 
data and information visualisation are slightly more general terms which handle 
more abstract data structures such as databases, graphs and include non 
scientific data, such as financial, marketing and business data. Information 
visualisation also has been described as the use of advanced computer 
graphics to present complex data, either to provide an overview, or to search for 
specific patterns [24]. The term "information visualisation" is suitable for 
describing this research, as this research focuses on visualising complex 
network security data for better understanding of that information. 
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2.3.2 Visualisation Framework 
According to Kennedy [24], a basic visualisation framework consists of 
four components which are the user component, the database component, the 
visualisation component and the interaction component. The user component 
describes the user description of the tasks or the needs analysis. The database 
component represents the actual data in the database and its structures. The 
visualisation component presents the data mapping and physical layout on the 
screen. The interaction component addresses the interaction between the user 
and the data presentation itself. All the four components become the main 
factors in deciding the style and the complexity of the visualisation. 
2.3.3 Effective Visualisation 
In developing a visualisation tool, the major challenge is to produce 
meaningful images from a set of data. Keller [25] suggested three main points 
that should be carefully thought trough in order to develop an effective 
visualisation tool. They are 
• Identify the visualisation goal. This is identifying the meaning that 
was sought from the data before an image is constructed. 
• Remove the mental roadblock. This means that one's should 
regard data as nothing more than a set of numbers that was 
wanted to be visualised. 
• Decide between data and phenomena. Data representation shows 
data values independently of the phenomenon. The viewer needs 
to deduce the relationship between the data value and the 
phenomenon. 
In the contextual-cue technique, the data values are related to the 
phenomenon and add meaning to the visualisation. If the phenomenon is the 
focus of the visualisation, then the choice of colour, shape, texture or setting 
should create the viewer's experience with the phenomenon [25]. As an 
example, a red colour will stand out compared to blue, with a black background 
colour. So, using a red colour to attract viewer attention is recommended [13] if 
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a dark background colour is used. This is also known as the colour chromatic 
contrast illusion characteristic. Colour, greyscale and black-and-white are 
suitable to represent data properties such as values and classification [25]. 
The use of lines can also suggest a relationship or connectivity [25]. 
Different line colour, thickness or style (dotted or dashed) can be used in order 
to indicate distinctions. 
A visualisation is considered effective if the visual image that represents 
the data can be performed "effectively" and "correctly" [26]. The term "correctly" 
means the visual image reflects the actual quantities and relationships of the 
actual data, whereas "effectively" means the maximum information the user can 
perceive in a minimal time. 
2.4 Network Security Visualisation Techniques 
From the author survey of literatures, there are mainly three types of 
dataset used in network security visualisation systems. They are 
• alerts and logs from lDS, 
• raw packets from network traffic collected using Tcpdump or 
Ethereal [27] programs or router accounting tools such as 
NetFlow2 [28], or 
• security logs of web server. 
Using these datasets, various visualisation tools with different 
approaches have been developed in the research community to uncover 
security events. Their techniques are summarised in the following section. 
2.4.1 20 and 3D Scatter Plot 
A scatter plot is a chart that uses Cartesian coordinates to display values 
2 Netflow is an auditing software that records network traffic flow in the router. It was introduced 
by CISCO in their routers but later become standard in other commercial routers. 
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of two or three variables depending on the scatter plot dimensions. The data are 
displayed as a collection of points, each having one coordinate on each axis. 
Scatter plots represent the association between the variables but not 
necessarily a cause and effect relationship. In network security visualisation, 
researchers adopt this technique but add some new features to improve the 
diagram. The new features are plotting the points using different colours to 
show value associated to them, adding lines between two points to show 
connectivity, and adding animation to show the temporal data attributes of the 
events. 
Abdullah [7] built a visualisation system that presented alarm data from 
the StealthWatch [29]IOS. In that visualisation, system administrators can get a 
summary of network activities and from that detect anomalous activities. The 
visualisation is based on a 20 scatter plot where the vertical axis represents 
internal IP addresses and the horizontal axis represents a 24 hour timeline. 
Alarms with different colour-coding will be located according to their IP address 
and instance of the event. The alarm colour-coding is to show the severity of the 
attack. The main display is divided into eight columns which allow the display of 
163,830 hosts (2.5 times class B IP address space, i.e. 2.5x65,532 hosts). The 
visualisation includes zoom, filter and glossing (like a tool tip) functions to help 
users explore the alarms. 
"The spinning Cube of potential doom" software developed by Stephen 
Lau [30] adopted a 30 scatter plot represented within a cube to visualise the 
connection logs from Bro3 [31]108. The software plots coloured dots using the 
internal IP address, the port address and all the possible IP address values on 
each axis. The different colour dots in the cube represent the connection status 
and mainly focus on unaccomplished connection. The user interacts with the 
display by zooming in, zooming out and swirling. The software replays the 
recorded Brc connection log by displaying the successful connections in grey 
and incomplete connection attempts in rainbow colours. The successful 
3 Bro is an open source, Unix-based Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) that passively 
monitors network traffic and looks for suspicious activity. 
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connections are coloured in grey to give less visual focus, while the incomplete 
connections are mapped in rainbow colours to give more attraction. The 
visualisation relies on the coloured dots to represent connections and assumes 
that unsuccessful connections are intrusion attempts. 
NVisionlP tool [3] is also based on a 20 scatter plot by plotting machines 
as dots according to their host IP address and their subnet values. The 
objectives are to give status information accurately and concisely with more 
details about specific machines, and to be able to process different sources of 
input. The tool includes filter, drill down and zooming to aid the network security 
analysts performing their tasks. In drill down, the information is presented in a 
histogram graph. 
McPherson et al. [32] developed a port-based detection tool for security 
events, known as PortVis that used raw packet header information. The tool 
plots coloured dots that represent port activities according to port number value 
and time. The main display is based on a 20 scatter plot, and the tool includes 
five other displays simultaneously. Selecting an area in the main display will 
show the port numbers used. Then, selecting a port number will show the port 
activity in a histogram graph. Using this selection technique, the user is allowed 
to view the same data with different levels of details. Another two displays are 
for colouring and visualisation settings. 
Ren and others [33] designed an interactive visualisation system, 
IOGraph by plotting the aggregated number of unsuccessful Tep connections 
on the vertical axis versus the time ordered sequence on the horizontal axis of a 
20 plot. Then the brightness of the mapped point was changed according to the 
density of the data at each pixel. The mapped data was either the pair of source 
lP-destination port, source lP-destination IP or destination lP-destination Port. 
This technique was named the histographs technique and was derived from the 
information mural visualisation technique [34]. In IOGraph, the darker is the 
point, the higher is the density of the data at that point. By clicking at that point, 
the traffic traces underneath it will be revealed, such as the list of source IP 
address and destination port pairs (see the bottom picture in Figure 2-1). This 
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system has successfully detected varieties of attacks and anomalies such as a 
port scanning, a worm outbreak and a stealthy TCPSYN flooding. 
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Figure 2-1: Examples of network security visualisation tools using 2D and 3D 
scatter plots. The picture on the upper left shows port scan attacks and 
the picture on the upper right shows zooming features in IDS 
Rainstorm. Furthermore, the bottom picture shows the IDGraph that 
applied the histograph techniques. 
2.4.2 Parallel Coordinates Plot 
Another diagram used by researchers is a parallel coordinates plot. A 
parallel coordinates plot is a technique for plotting multivariate data. In the 
parallel coordinates plot, a set of parallel axes are drawn for each variable. 
Then , for a given row of data, a line is drawn to connect the value of that row on 
each corresponding axis. 
VisFlowConnect is prototype software developed by Xiaoxin Yin [10], that 
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uses connection logs of Netflow to visualise network traffic patterns. The design 
was based on the parallel coordinates plot which displays NetFlow records as 
links between two machines or domains. The axes are the originating host of 
the network traffic, the internal domain and the destination host of the outgoing 
traffic (see the picture on the left in Figure 2-2). The line thickness and darker 
colour tone suggest the amount of traffic. VisFlowConnect also has other 
features such as statistical functions that give the users statistical figures of 
traffic flow in bytes to and from a host. The users can filter the data by port, 
protocol, packet size and transfer rate. 
Krasser [35] also used parallel coordinates plots in his tools but added 
time animation and coupled the parallel coordinated plot with scatter plots in 2D 
and 3D. The result shows the combination provides security analysts with a 
rapid examination of network traffic and quick detection of network anomalies. 
The visualisation design consists of two vertical lines. The line on the left is for 
the source IP address and the line on the right is for the destination port 
number. The connectivity lines in green show the TCP protocol and lines in blue 
show the UDP protocol. Glyphs on the left and the right show the age of the 
packet. The further the glyphs distance from the centre, the older will be the 
packet and the height of the glyph suggests the packet size (see the picture on 
the right in Figure 2-2). 
Rumint is a system that visualises raw network packets in Tcpdump 
format into a seven visualisations view [36]. The objective of this system is to 
analyse the underlying network packets that cause the alarm. The seven 
visualisations are the scrolling text, parallel coordinates plot, glyph-based 
animation, thumbnail tool bar, binary rainfall visualisation, byte frequency and 
detail displays. 
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Figure 2-2: On the left, a visualisation from VisFlowConnect shows a virus 
outbreak pattern, and on the right is the visualisation snapshot from 
Krasser. 
2.4.3 Circle View 
CircleView is a new approach for visualizing multidimensional time-
referenced data sets proposed by Keim [37] . The work by Livnat [38] used ideas 
from CircleView in their visualisation (see Figure 2-3). Livnat [38] presented a 
novel paradigm for visual correlation of Snort alerts. This paradigm provides the 
situational awareness in complex network environments. The approach is 
based on the intuitive of what, when, and where, which they term as w3. In their 
system, alerts are grouped and viewed hierarchically with their what, and where 
attributes. Then the when attribute reveals the temporal distribution of attack 
trends. 
The visualisation display is designed in a circular form , which consists of 
local network topology in the centre and the alerts are grouped according to the 
alert types in the surrounding ring. The time is indicated by the radius of the 
ring. Moving from the inner ring towards the outside ring is like moving back in 
history. In other words, alerts in the inner ring are later than those in the outside 
ring. The internal node size is proportionate to the quantity of alerts it receives 
and the line shows the alert type. 
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Figure 2-3 : Example of VisAlert visualisation using CircleView idea. 
2.4.4 Matrix and Graphs 
Matrix and graphs are another visualisation technique used by 
researchers in this area to explore network security data. Koike [4] used 
complex tables with symbols and colours to present an overview of Snort alerts. 
The display comprises of three 2D frames, known as the source address frame, 
alert frame and source-destination matrix frame (see the picture on the left in 
Figure 2-4). Based on heuristic rules, Koike considers the alerts that are false 
positives when they appear successively; appearing many times in the entire 
log , conflicting with the provided services in the network, and alerts concerning 
other networks. The false alerts detected from the heuristic rules are not filtered 
but are displayed onscreen to allow the administrators to judge them. 
Icons with different shapes are used to classify the attacks and colour-
coding is employed to prioritise the alerts. Event time, alert type, attacker 
source, attack destination, and details of access are considered the essential 
information to be displayed. 
Abdullah [39] in other work, used packet header information to plot 
histogram graphs and uncover security related events from them (see the 
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picture on the right in Figure 2-4). The technique involves plotting packet count 
histograms and stacking them using different colour-codes according to the 
range of port numbers versus the horizontal time axis. In this technique, any 
histogram blocks with high height represent anomaly traffic as high histogram 
blocks suggest high network activity during that period. The dataset used in this 
research are the Honeynet traffic, because all Honeynet traffic is considered 
malicious, and this will give a good visualisation illustration. 
A Honeynet is a network of computers or seNers that is used to attract 
malicious traffic [40]. They appear to contain information or resources that 
would be of value to attackers. In practice, they have no production value and 
therefore should not see any legitimate traffic or activity. However, the traffic 
seen may also contain benign traffic which was wrongly arrived at the Honeynet 
due to incorrect configuration etc. As the quantities of benign traffic are small , 
whatever traffic is captured can then be assumed to be malicious or 
unauthorized. 
Other tools use graphs, tables and pie charts to simplify reporting and 
querying of alerts. Examples include SnortAlog [41], logparser [42] and analyse 
console for intrusion detection (ACID) [43]. 
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Fig ure 2-4: On the left, visualisation from SnortView and on the right, example 
of histogram graph. 
2.4 .5 Visual Listing 
This method consists of visualising information in a 2D display where the 
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vertical axis is the time and the horizontal axis is the value of the data. Work by 
J. Colombe [5] used this method with multivariate Bernoulli event representation 
to convert the text alerts from RealSecure IOS to a visual form. In this method, 
each comma limited text alarm is converted to a binary form (0 or 1) that marks 
the presence or absence of a text descriptor in the particular field. The binary 
string will then form an alarm vector that corresponds to a specific descriptor 
token. The typicality score of each alert is also calculated. This will give a 
differentiation of highly typical alerts and anomaly alerts by colour coding. 
The token vectors are then arranged in chronological order, from the top 
to the bottom in a visualisation display. Each row will represent an alert and 
each column shows the present or absence of a specific descriptive token . The 
illuminating column shows the presence of the token in the alert while the colour 
suggests the typicality score. An empty background represents the absence of 
the token. The security analyst gets the details of the alarm in textual form by 
mouse-click of the specific row. 
Work by Stefan Axelsson [44] also used the visual listing idea. The 
visualisation lists the web server access request logs with a colour-code (see 
Figure 2-5(a)). The colour-code is achieved by calculating for each alert a token 
score using a self-learning Bayesian system. The Bayesian system is similar to 
the approach used for Bayesian e-mail spam detection. 
The token score is the probability that a token appears in a malicious 
message. All alerts that have a token score greater than a threshold will be 
considered as harmful and intrusive. Based on the token score calculated , 
colours are mapped from green via yellow to red to show if the message was 
benign or malicious. The prototype is called the 'Bayesvis ' tool. 
Rumint [36] also applied this technique in three of its visualisation 
windows. The scrolling text display visualises network packets, one in each 
horizontal row according to user encoding preference (ASCII , hexadecimal and 
decimal) in chronological order. The packet contents are displayed in the binary 
rainfall visualisation and the byte frequency visualisation as in scrolling text 
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display (see Figure 2-5(b)). 
(a) 
(b) 
Figure 2-5: (a) Work by Colombe and (b) Example from Rumint. In both 
pictures, each row represents an alert or a network traffic packet and is 
in chronological order. 
2.4.6 Network layout 
This technique involves arranging nodes that represent computer hosts 
in 3D space and linking them with lines to show connectivity. Nyarko [8] applied 
this idea and incorporated also ideas from electromagnetics, fluid dynamics and 
gravitational theory with haptic technologies to provide another visualisation 
dimension of network intrusion data. The application , network intrusion 
visualisation application with haptic integration (NIVA). allows the analyst to 
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examine interactively and to detect attack across time using three-dimensional 
display. In this model, glyphs are coloured according to their domain and the 
severity of the attack is represented by the link line colour. An alternative view in 
NIVA is called a helix technique model (see the picture on the left in Figure 2-6). 
In this model, glyphs are arranged at the circumference of a helix. The glyph 
colour shows the domain and the connectivity line colour signals the severity of 
an attack. 
VISUAL [12] also used this technique to visualise the network traffic, 
based on home centric perspective. The network traffic data are in the Tcpdump 
format. Each node is represented as a square with internal hosts in the central 
grid and external hosts outside it (see the picture on the right in Figure 2-6). The 
line between a pair of hosts shows the connectivity between them. The software 
includes other information, such as port number, external host activity and 
timeline filter. 
Work by G. Vert [45] presents the network intrusion information using a 
spicule4 with different diameter, vector and line to show the security risk of the 
computer, service and amount of traffic used. To understand the model , let 
consider bacteria attacks5 to a computer A as an example. Bacteria attacks are 
generally localised on a single computer, and are characterised by the use of 
large amounts of computer resources i.e . high CPU usage and user processes. 
When the CPU usage and user processes are high, the CPU usage and 
user processes vectors move towards the prime axis , y. As CPU utilisation 
increases, other user processes starve. Therefore, system processes and 
system files vectors move towards the x-ax is. Another visual that associates 
with the spicule model is a singularity model. This singularity model shows the 
computer activity relatively to other known computers . 
4 A spicule is a spheroid geometric primitive. 
s A Bacleria attack is a virus that only replicates itself but did not damage files. However, it can 
damage Ihe syslem. 
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Figure 2-6: On the left, visualisation from NIVA using the helix technique and on 
the right, a snapshot from VISUAL. 
2.5 Summary 
Analysis of visualisation tools in the previous section reveals there are 
some areas that can be improved to make the visualisation more effective. One 
of the improvements is to link the visualised alert with the raw packet that 
causes it. Nyarko [8] and Abdullah [7] suggested the use of other tools, such as 
RealSecure and Black Ice for NIVA, and Rumint for IDSRainstorm, to analyse 
related packets. The advantage of having this function available in the 
visualisation is it allows the network security analysts to examine directly the 
traffic that causes the alert and make a correct judgement of it. 
Researchers have adapted various techniques to create an effective 
visualisation tool. Among the techniques are: the parallel coordinates plot, the 
2D and 3D scatter plots, the network layout, the complex matrix and graphs as 
well as the colour-coding technique. The author considers tools developed by 
Vin, (VisFlowConnect) [10] and Krasser [35] using the parallel coordinates plot 
technique. Work by McPherson (PortVis) [32], Lau (The Spinning Cube) [30], 
Abdullah (IDSRainstorm) [7] , Conti (Rumint) [36] and Lakkaraju (NVisionIP) [3] 
either use the 2D or 3D scatter plot technique. These scatter plot techniques 
are popular among researchers. 
Another popular technique is the network layout in 3D space to present 
the network security data. This technique has been employed by Nyarko [8] Ball 
[12] and Vert [45]. This technique sometimes suffers from scalability issues in 
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comparison to parallel coordinates plot and scatter plot techniques. 
Scalability is the main concern in security visualisation because of the 
huge amounts of data involved and the large number of machines under 
supervision. Visualisation tools [3, 5, 30, 32] are scalable, as thousands of 
records can be displayed in one visualisation display. On the other hand, the 
network layout in 3D space uses objects such as spheres [8, 45] or squares [12] 
as a computer host, and lines to show communication. 
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Chapter 3: Designing Visualisation Tools for 
Network Security Data 
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This chapter discusses the approach of this visualisation prototype 
follows. The need analysis of the network security visualisation tool and issues 
about it are also presented. In addition , the block diagram and the object 
oriented design of the prototype software are presented. The features of the 
visualisation prototype, it advantages, and how it fulfils the need analysis are 
discussed and explained. 
3.1 The Need Analysis 
The need analysis for this prototype was gathered from various published 
works in the literature. The findings by Yurcik and others [46] from interviews 
with the security operators at the National Centre for Supercomputing 
Applications (NCSA) , and two incident response centres, highlighted the need 
of 'situational awareness'. Their survey found that any visualisation tool should 
provide the analyst with an overview of the situational awareness of the 
supervised network. The suggested way to achieve this was to present an 
overview of the supervised network on a single display. 
Paulson [47] also quoting the NSCA researchers stressed that 
visualisation tools should include forensic support as is impossible for someone 
to watch the screens all the time. When problems occurred, these tools could 
easily find out when the events occurred, look at what happened, and drill down 
for more detail. 
In a study, Ball and others [12] determined the needs of the user 
community by interviewing 22 professional system administrators specialising in 
computer and network security from two large universities. The outcome from 
their work suggested that network administrators need to know what was 
happening in their own network. They were not interested in information about 
other networks which were not under their responsibilities. 
Komlodi [48] identified the visualisation needs and proposed a task 
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model that would help the security analyst to perform their typical tasks. In this 
model, the basic analyst tasks consist of monitoring, analysis and response. 
Monitoring tasks involve checking and identifying the potential true alerts. 
Analysing tasks involve analysing the potential alerts and diagnosing them. 
Lastly, the response tasks are the analyst responses to the true attacks. From 
the findings, Komlodi recommended that visualisation tools should contain 
features of simple displays, filter options, interaction , multiple view options and 
reporting tools. 
Meanwhile, D'Amico [49] considered the analyst tasks to be either 
reactive or proactive. According to D'Amico, an ideal visualisation tool should 
help the analyst to perform both tasks. The reactive mode is where the analyst 
usually works in real-time. To visualise in real-time, the tool should be able to 
update data automatically and highlight it according to the alert priority. 
Conversely, in the proactive mode, the analyst needs data exploration, 
navigation and animation tools to help identify the anomalous patterns. 
In other work, Goodall [50] found simi lar findings as Komlodi [48] but 
added the need of analysing not only the packet header information but also the 
packet payload. Goodall also added that a visualisation tool must be intuitively 
understood by the user. The Table 3-1 summarises the detai ls of the user need 
analysis found in the literature. 
Table 3-1 . The summary of the need analysis for Network Security Visualisation tools. 
Needs 
Yurcik and others [46] • The user needs to get an overview of the monitored 
system - "situational awareness". 
• The tool should have forensic support. 
Ball [12] • The tools should be able to focus on events happening 
in the monitored network. 
Komlodi [48] • The tools should address the user needs in performing: 
0 Monitoring tasks 
0 Analysing tasks 
0 Response tasks 
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D'Amico [49J • The tools should address the proactive and reactive 
nature of an analyst's tasks. 
Goodall [50J • The tools should be able to view and analyse the 
packet payload . 
• The visual layout should be intuitively understood. 
3.2 Some Issues in Network Security Visualisation Tool Design 
Apart from the need analysis, researchers should also address other 
important issues in the network security visualisation. Erbacher [51] states that 
the main issue in designing network security visualisation tool is scalability. The 
scalability is an issue because of huge amounts of related data for network 
security. The data are not only numerous but also of high dimensionality . As an 
example, port numbers, and the class B IP addresses, can have a range up to 
2 ' 6 (65536). 
Another characteristic of network security data is that they are temporally 
related. This is because some attacks are distributed over time. Therefore, a 
visualisation tool should address this issue, to allow the tool to expose the 
attacks. The data should also be studied according to the time sequence of the 
events. Sometimes, it is the correlation of events over time that distinguishes 
attacks in concern . A successful network security visualisation tool should be 
able to address this issue. 
Ren [52] mentioned the advantages of using visualisation to uncover 
network security events were indisputable. However, Ren argued that a good 
visualisation tool should have the following characteristics: 
• Being representational: convey information accurately and 
effectively. 
• Being cognitive: lessen the burden of analysis of huge and 
complex data, and easy to understand. 
• Being analytical : allow the user to investigate and analyse related 
data. 
• Being exploratory: allow walkthrough of the data set and detail on 
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demand support. 
• Being situational aware: allow top level overview of a supervised 
network with minimum human effort. 
3.3 The Design Framework for a Network Security Visualisation 
Tool 
The author proposes a framework for the design of the visualisation tool 
as in Figure 3-1. The design framework is composed of data storage, data 
interface, data processing (adaptation and mapping) , user interfaces and 
interaction, and visualisation display. This design framework became the main 
prototype software architecture. The author noted there were likenesses in the 
architecture with other visualisation systems, but the author could not find any 
literature that suggested the most effective one. However, the prototype design 
framework supports communication between the data and the visualisation 
engine. It also gives the flexibility to design the GUI and the interactive features. 
Snort IDS 
sensor 
Visualisation Display 
Figure 3-1. Design framework for the visualisation tool. 
Add/Edit 
Training 
Samples 
The IDS environment used in this study was Snort with alert logging to a 
MySQL database. The Snort engine used the standard signature rules and 
configuration provided by the Snort community group. The Snort IDS was 
chosen because of its widely used in the research community and industry, and 
its ability to log alerts to the database. The Snort IDS can monitor traffic in real-
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time and alerts the user when it detects anomalous traffic. Snort can also 
examine off-line Tcpdump traffic by processing the file in Tcpdump reading 
mode. However, Snort produces as many alerts as many other IDS. 
The database used in this work was the MySOL [53] open source 
database. MySOL is known for its reliability and reputation as the most used 
open source database in the world. Using the database storage allows better 
filtering , querying and fetching of data for the visualisation software. 
The visualisation software was developed using the Python [54] 
programming language. The Python version used is the Python Enthought 
Edition 2.4.3. Python Enthought edition is a free distribution of Python under the 
Windows operating system which includes several pre-compiled libraries for 
scientific data visualisation and manipulation. Python itself is an interpreted, 
interactive , object-oriented programming language that combines remarkable 
power with clear syntax. The Python implementation is portable and runs on 
UNIX, Linux, Windows and Mac OS/X. However, the author used the Windows 
environment in performing this work. The designed of the graphical user 
interface (GUI) in the visualisation software was done with the help of wxPython 
2.6 module. The wxPython module is an add-on module for python to design 
the GUI. 
The graphical engine used in the software was the Visualisation Toolkits 
(VTK) [55] version 5.0. The VTK is an open source object oriented software for 
3D computer graphics, image processing, and visualisation. VTK is used by 
thousands of researchers and developers around the world. VTK consists of a 
C++ class library and interpreted interface layers for T clfTk, Java, and Python. 
3.3.1 The Object Oriented Visualisation Software 
Python as an advanced scripting programming language has the 
advantage of object oriented programming. This has enabled the author to 
develop the prototype software using object oriented software design. The 
simplified class diagram (see Figure 3-2) shows the relationship of each class in 
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the software. The class diagram shows there are three main classes in the 
visualisation prototype. The classes are the GUI controls, the Visualisation 
classes and the VTK windows classes. 
There are three databases in the visualisation software. The databases 
are the geographical location database (Geo Database) , the Snort database 
and the classifier training sample database. The geographical location database 
used is from the MaxMind GeolP database [56]. The GeolP database is a 
geographical location database of IP addresses developed and maintained by 
the commercial company MaxMind. The database is available either with an 
open source licence or with a commercial licence. The open source version 
contains less accurate information compare to the commercial one. This project 
uses the open source licence database and the database is installed locally. 
The interface between the software and the databases are either through the 
Snort interface class, GeoLocation Interface class or Update training sample 
class according to the information requests. 
Node, line, label , colour setting, world Map and coordinate are classes to 
create a 3D image with its specific attributes. The visual interaction of the user 
with the objects is managed by the Pick Actor class. Meanwhile the machine 
learning of the software is performed by the Classifier class. 
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Figure 3-2: The simplified class diagram of the software. 
3.3.2 The Data Input 
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The inputs for the prototype are the data produced by Snort. Snort when 
detecting suspicious network traffic will produce alerts and log them to the Snort 
database and logs file . The textual logs file is normally saved in the log directory 
of the Snort installation. The information from the logs file is minimal compared 
to the information in the logs database. Figure 3-3 shows the sample of Snort 
alerts found in the alert logs file . 
I"] [1 :1560:6] WEB-MISC Idecl access n 
[Classification : access to a potentially vulnerable web application] [Priority: 2] 
04/09-15:19:46.079304197.2 18.177.69 :16511 -> 172.16.1 14.50:80 
TCP TTL:63 TOS:OxO ID:5357 IpLen :20 DgmLen:298 DF 
' " AP'' ' Seq : Ox97531 646 Ack: OxDADDDD8F Win : Ox7D78 TcpLen: 20 
[Xref => hltp1Icve.mitre.erg/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=1999-0678)[Xref => 
http://www.securityfecus.cem/bid/318] 
Figure 3-3. A sample of Snort alert in text form. 
The Snort log database provides more information and is easy to access. 
The relationship diagram of Snort tables used in this visualisation software is 
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shown in the Figure 3-4. The advantages of using a database apart from 
accessibility are the portability with other application, ease of querying and of 
filtering information. The 'defaultclasstype' table is a new table that the author 
has created in the Snort database. This table refers the Snort signature to its 
class type. The default class type of each Snort signature is available in the text 
file in the Snort installation directory. Table 3-2 describes the role of the tables 
in the Snort database. There are some other tables in the Snort database which 
are not important here and therefore those tables are not mentioned. 
Figure 3-4. The Snort database log structure. 
Table 3-2. The description tables in the Snort database. 
Table Description 
event Meta -data about the detected alert 
signature Normalized listing of alert/signature names, priorities, and 
revision IDs 
sill.. class Normalized listing of alert/signature classi fications 
Data Contents of packet payload 
iphdr IP protocol fields 
tcphdr TCP protocol fields 
udphdr UDP protocol fields 
icmphdr ICMP protocol fields 
defaultclasstype Classtype reference 
The visualisation software extracts the data from various tables in the 
Snort database and prepares them for the visualisation software. Each alert is 
represented as a tuple (a finite sequence of information) of 13 fields before 
sending them to the visualisation engine. The list of the fields is as in the Table 
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3-3. 
Table 3-3. The alert tuple. 
Field Desciption 
Sid The sensor id. 
cid The alert id. 
signature The alert signature id. 
timestamp The date and time. 
sig_name The alert signature name. 
sig"priority The alert signature priority. 
ip_src The source IP address. 
ip_dst The destination IP address. 
ip"proto The IP protocol. 
Sport The source port number. 
Oport The destination port number. 
classtype The class type information 
datalen The datagram length. 
3.4 The Visualisation Design 
The biggest challenge in visualisation software is to design a visual 
layout that is intuitive. With the user needs and the issues discussed in 3.1 and 
3.2 as a guide, the author designed prototype software that incorporated 
multiple views options with interactivity, drill down and graphical user interface 
feature to ease the monitoring and analysis tasks. 
The author approach is to combine the visualisation techniques with a 
machine learning classifier. Therefore, this tool is able to learn from previous 
examples and classifies alerts into false and true alerts. The false alerts can 
then be hidden or coloured differently thus allowing the pattern of true alerts to 
emerge. 
Another approach is to use glyphs layout technique which are parallel 
coord inates plot and scatter plot techniques. The author also designed a novel 
time series 3D AlertGraph , an extension of 2D histographs [33] technique into 
three dimensions. 
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This prototype software has seven 3D views, which are the time series 
3D AlertGraph, timeline, plane, world globe, world plane, parallel coordinates 
plot and scatter plot views. The 3D time series AlertGraph view is used as the 
general oveNiew of the network security alerts data. 
The objective of the multiple views is to give viewers different 
perspectives of the data because some abnormal patterns are not obvious to 
identify in one display but might be easy in another. 
3.4.1 Time Series 3D AlertGraph 
The 3D time series AlertGraph is seNed as a top level oveNiew of the 
security alerts status. This view gives the quantity of alerts received from the 
pair of source IP address and destination port in a time inteNal. This view also 
summarises the alerts into different colours to indicate the quantity of alerts 
from (SRCIP, DPORT) pairs and uses false alert classification to highlight the 
true alerts. Through interaction tools, the alerts can be highlighted according to 
the source lP, destination IP or destination port. In this view, a huge number of 
alerts can be viewed in a single display and a temporal characteristic of the 
attacks can be discovered. 
The time series 3D AlertGraph was plotted by mapping the quantity of 
alerts received from the source IP and destination port (SRCIP, DPORT) pair on 
the Z-axis, the destination IP addresses on the Y-axis and the time ordered 
sequence on the X-axis of the 3D plot. Each mapped point in the 3D plot was 
attached with a coloured sphere. The sphere was coloured according to the 
number of the different pairs of (SRCIP, DPORT) and the number of alerts 
received at that point. Pictures in Figure 3-5 show the schematic diagram and a 
day view of 3D AlertGraph. 
In this view, each mapped point represented the number of alerts 
received by a destination IP in a given inteNal from (SRCIP, DPORT) pairs. In 
an inteNal , there might be more than one (SRCIP, DPORT) pair that had the 
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same number of alerts. The author counted the (SRCIP, DPORT) pairs and its 
value was used as one of the variables to colour the sphere. Another variable 
used to colour the sphere was the number of alerts at that point which in this 
case was the Z-axis value. The scalar coefficient to colour the sphere was the 
sum of number of alerts and number of (SRCIP , DPORT) pairs at a point. 
Therefore, the coefficient was calculated as: 
• Scalar T oColour coefficient, ePTS 
- ePTS = PPTS + Z PTS 
• where 
PPTS= number of (SRCIP,DPORT) pairs at the point 
- ZPTs=number of alerts for each (SRCIP,DPORT) pair at the point 
By considering the quantity of alerts and the number of pairs available at 
a point, ranges of colours can be achieved. In this method, the quantity of alerts 
and the number of pairs available at a point will have the same importance in 
the colour scheme. This variation of colours is helpful to understand the network 
status and identify the true attacks. When the false alert classifier is applied, the 
author assigns to the true attacks a scalar coefficient in such a way that the 
sphere will be coloured in red. This is achieved by assigning the maximum 
value between the number of pairs and the number of alerts in each pair to the 
scalar coefficient of the true alert sphere. The pseudo-code to calculate the 
scalar coefficient in this way is as follows: 
• ScalarToColour coefficient, CPTS 
- If PTS contains 'TRUE ALERT': 
• e PTs = Max_Pairs or Max_Z whichever is higher 
- Else: 
• e pTS = P PTS + Z PTS 
• Where 
- Max_Pairs is the maximum number of pairs in the whole period 
- Max_Z is the maximum number of alerts from all the pairs 
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Figure 3-5: The time series 3D AlertGraph - The upper picture shows the 
schematic drawing. The bottom picture shows a view from 3D 
AlertGraph. 
Mapping the scalar coeHicient to colour was achieved by using the 
VTKLookupTable class in the VTK module. For the VTKLookupTable class to 
create the range of colours, the class was supplied with the minimum and the 
maximum range of the scalar coefficient in the monitoring period . The mapping 
colour table was set to vary from blue to red. The colour transformation was 
using the logarithmic function in the VTKLookupTable. The blue colour 
represented the lowest value and the red was the highest. 
This colour variation is to highlight to the user, the density of alerts and 
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the (SRCIP, DPORT) pairs in the data. The red colour will suggest either 
• many alerts from a unique (SRCIP, DPORT) pair or 
• many alerts from many (SRCIP, DPORT) pairs but with few alerts 
or 
• both having high values or 
• the alerts are the true alerts 
This 3D AlertGraph could also highlight the alerts received either by the 
destination IP address, source IP address or destination port. These features 
can be accessed from the interaction tools of the software. 
The interactive tools were added in such a way as to perform 
Shneiderman's visual information-seeking Mantra, 'Overview first , zoom and 
filter, details-an-demand' [57J and to understand the data easier. The first 
interaction was by 'picking' the actor (section 3.4.7). The details of the source 
lP, destination IP and destination port will be popped-up with the time period of 
the event, the alerts quantity and the number of (SRCIP, DPORT) pairs. 
The second interaction tool was the highlight of a specific source IP or 
destination IP or destination port by clicking the child item in the SRCIP-DSTIP-
DPORT tree panel. By double clicking a destination lP, a transparent green 
plane will appear with yellow lines from the 3D plot base to all data points in that 
respective destination IP (see Figure 3-6). The yellow lines make a histogram 
graph of the number of alerts received according to the time (see Figure 3-7) . 
However, double clicking the source IP or destination port will highlight the 
spheres having that information. At the same time, yellow lines will be drawn 
from the 3D plot base to the respective data points. Other settings the users can 
modify include the start time, the monitoring period, the time interval and the 
scales of the 3D plot. 
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Figure 3-6: The graphical user interface and pop-up window in the 3D 
AlertGraph design. 
Figure 3-7: A view of a destination IP selection that shows the green 
transparent layer with the histogram graph of vertical yellow lines. 
In summary, the 3D AlertGraph shows the alerts received by the 
destination IP address from the pair of (SRCIP, DPORT) in a time interval. The 
colour of the sphere showed the sum of the (SRCIP, DPORT) pairs with the 
number of alerts at a point. A single red sphere at the top of the 3D plot may 
suggest a possible DOS attack and continuous horizontal red spheres at the 
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bottom of the 3D plot may point out a port scanning or a port sweep attack. 
Advantages of this view are 
1. It summarises the alerts into different colours to indicate the quantity 
of alerts from (SRCIP, DPORT) pairs. 
2. It highlights the true alerts. 
3. Through interaction tools, the alerts can be highlighted according to 
the source lP , destination IP or destination port. 
4. A huge numbers of alerts can be viewed in a single display. 
5. A temporal characteristic of attacks can be discovered. 
3.4.2 Parallel Coordinates Plot View 
Figure 3-8 shows the schematic drawing of the parallel coordinates plot. 
The parallel coordinates plot consists of plotting five attributes of the alert and 
connecting them with lines. The attributes are the source port, source IP 
address, alert signature, destination IP address and destination port with the 
third dimension is the indicative quantity of alerts having that particular 
attributes. The lines connecting the attributes are coloured according to the 
transport layer protocol used. Users can change the colour setting in the co lour 
setting window. Previous research has shown that a parallel coordinates plot is 
good in detecting IP sweep, Port Sweep, NMAP or simi lar attack. Figure 3-9 
shows the visualisation display of parallel plot view. 
Signature Destination 
o-__ ~~~ID~IC~la~s~s~p~e __ ~ __ ~~rt 
Source Destination 
IP IP 
Figure 3-8: The schematic diagram of parallel plot view. 
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Figure 3-9: The parallel plot view. 
3.4.3 Scatter Plot View 
In the scatter plot view, six dimensions of alert attributes are displayed at 
a time. The attributes are the local host, alert signature, event time, alert priority, 
alerts quantity and attacker's origin. The alert priority is shown by the alert 
object colour which is red for high, blue for medium and green for low. The alert 
priority colour is consistence through out the visualisation tool. Alert objects 
used (as used later in section 3.4.9) are the 
• Cube for alerts received by the local network, 
• Cone for group alerts received by the local network, 
• Sphere for alerts originating from the local network, and 
• Cylinder for the alerts originating from the local network. 
The Figure 3-10 shows the schematic diagram of the scatter plot. In the 
scatter plot view, the users have five further views which are: 
• the alerts view, 
• the alerts indicative quantity view, 
• the alerts and their indicative quantity view, 
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• the alerts and their indicative quantity view with geographical 
location of the attacker origin , and 
• the alerts and their indicative quantity view with the attackers are 
grouped in their network domain. 
Figure 3-11 shows the last two scatter plot options. The first image, noted 
(a) shows a view of the attacker's origin by connecting alerts with lines to a 
world map. The second image, noted (b) shows how the attackers are grouped 
in their network domain. The line colour identifies the internet transport protocol 
used in the attack. With these views, users can identify the geographical 
location of the attackers and whether the attackers are from the same network 
domain or not. 
Quanlity (in 
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Figure 3-10: The schematic diagram of scatter plot view 
Page 46 
..... . - -. .. .. ....... ..:. 
" ... . ". 
"''''''''' ' 
". '''-
...... ,"-
r---_ 
~ i i t\ ! 1 • 
(a) (b) 
Figure 3-1 1: (a) Geographical view of an attack to local network. (b) Attackers 
were grouped in their network domain. 
The domain is grouped using the attacker's IP address information. The 
IP addresses which are assigned to organisations in blocks belong to one of 
three classes : class A, class B, or class C. By knowing the value of its first 
octet, the class of an IP address is known . The attackers were grouped by using 
the default sub net mask of the attacker's network class. The Table 3-4 shows 
the network classes and their default subnet masks and Figure 3-12 shows the 
domain arrangement. 
Table 3-4: IP network classes. 
First Octet Network Class/Default subnet mask 
1 - 126 Class A f 255.0.0.0 
128 - 191 Class B f 255.255.0.0 
192 - - > Class C / 255.255.255.0 
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Figure 3-12: The attacker's subnets were arranged randomly. Each sphere 
represents a sub net. 
The indicative quantity of the alert is shown by the height of the coloured 
bar that is positioned at the intersection of the local IP address and the 
signature name or class type. The bar height shows the quantity of alerts of the 
host with its respective signature and the bar colour signals the alert priority 
(green : low, blue: medium, red: high) . Users can change these colours to other 
colours as they wish. When the bar colour is orange, it shows the local host is 
the origin of the attacks. The height of the bar is computed by changing the alert 
quantity using a logarithmic function (bar height = log (alert quantity)) . 
The scatter plot view becomes the summary display of the alerts for the 
local network. The advantage of these views is that the alerts are clustered 
according to alert type, destination IP address, source IP address, geographical 
location and attacker network domain. The users can use the advanced subnet 
mask to reduce the hosts in the monitored network. This can be done in the 
local network settings by changing the bits number in the Classless Inter-
Domain Routing6 (CIDR) notation. 
6 A CIDR network address looks like this '192.30.250.00/18'. The " 192.30.250.00' is Ihe network 
address itself and the '18' says the first 18 bits are Ihe nelwork part of the address and the 
remaining 14 bils are for speci fic host addresses in IPv4 system. 
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3.4.4 Timeline and Plane View 
What, when and where are trivial questions asked by any analyst doing 
any investigation task. The what, when and where ideas were also used by 
Livnat and others [38] in their work (see section 2.4.3). The author work differs 
from theirs as they presented the ideas in a Circle View with network topology 
while the author presents it in a 3D display. 
Alternatively, the author answered these questions by visualising the 
what, when and where through the design as in the schematic diagram in the 
Figure 3-15 (3D view with timeline). In this view, an alert is displayed using a 
line connecting from the source IP address to the destination IP address 
passing through the time axis which suggests the alert instance. The lines are 
clustered according to their signature id. Signature ids are placed at the middle 
of the visualisation that separates the local network from the external network. 
The signature ids are labelled by the ID number with respective attack priority 
colour (Iow: green, medium: blue, high: red). The vertical axis represents the 
selected monitoring period with start time at the bottom and end time at the top. 
The what is the alert represented by a line from the source to the 
destination through a specific signature. The when is the intersection of the 
connection line with the time plane. While the where is the source and the 
destination IP address of the attack. 
The what attribute will answer questions about the attack signature, the 
protocol used and the details of the alert. The when attribute will provide the 
time perspective of the alert and the instances of the attack. Lastly, the where 
attribute will provide information about the source and the destination of the 
attack, information about IP address and their geographical location. 
The alert object position on each line suggests whether the local network 
is the target or victim of an attack. If the object is on the local network side, it 
means the attack is targeting the local network. On the other hand, if the object 
is located on the external network side, it means the local network is targeting 
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an external network. 
The local and external hosts are arranged in semicircles. If the semicircle 
is full , a new circle will be created with an increased radius and height. With this 
arrangement many hosts can be visualised. The hosts coordinate calculation is 
shown in the flowchart in the Figure 3-13 , while Figure 3-14 shows the 
simulated host arrangement with 4554 hosts. More hosts can be visualised, but 
the only constraint will be the system resources. 
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• z=z • z=z 
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! ! 
( finish ) 
~-
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Figure 3-13. The flow chart of the host coordinates algorithm in the timeline 
view. 
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Figure 3-14. A view of 4554 hosts arrangement in the timeline view. 
On the other hand, the plane view projects the timeline view without the 
time axis. This projection will remove the temporal notion of the display and will 
show fewer lines as attacks with the same signature, source and destination will 
appear only once. The Figure 3-15 shows both the schematic diagram of 3D 
view with timeline and without timeline, and pictures in Figure 3-16 show the 
actual views. 
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Figure 3-15: The schematic diagram of the timeline and plane views. 
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(a) Timeline View 
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(b) Plane View 
Figure 3-16 : The timeline and plane views. 
3.4.5 Geographical Display 
Another two views used to show all related IP addresses in their 
geographical location. The display is either in a world globe or in a world plane 
view. In these views, the author displays the geographical location of the 
external IP address that causes the attacks to the local network with their 
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indicative quantity of alerts. The height of the logarithmic scale bars represents 
the indicative quantity of the alerts and the co lour of the bars shows the alert 
priority (Iow: green, medium : blue , high: red). The geographical location of the 
attackers can also be viewed in scatter plot view (see Figure 3-1 1) with alert 
lines connecting the alerts to their respective source. 
Figure 3-17: The Geographical View in a world globe. 
Figure 3-18: The Geographical View in a world plane. 
3.4.6 Timeline animation and Real-time monitoring 
The timeline animation is designed to give the user the exact sequence 
of the attacks. The user can replay the attacks from a selected period. The 
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default replay speed is set to 60 times faster than real-time; which the user can 
change the speed setting . A video player type control panel is also provided to 
allow the user to control the animation. The user can also use the slider to slide 
through the animation . This feature offers the possibility of exploration and 
navigation through the alerts. The animation can be displayed in the timeline 
view and in the parallel coordinates view. 
---T'fIlge software also has the ability to monitor alerts in real-time. This is 
performed when Snort sent alerts to the database in real-time. The software will 
query the database and refresh the display every three seconds. A three-
second period or slightly more is taught to be sufficient to inform users of new 
attack. The user also receives an update of the alerts received by the source 
and destination IP address pair (Figure 3-19) . They also have access to the 
detailed information on IP address, alert and attack signature by using 'picking' 
actors as mentioned in section 3.4.7. 
The observation window for real-time monitoring is set for a four hour 
period. At the end of this period, the window will be emptied and reset to clear 
the display. Figure 3-19 shows the control panel for real-time monitoring. The 
user can choose either to display in the timeline view or the scatter plot view 
with the geographical location of the attacker. 
To make the monitoring in real-time effortless, users can apply the false 
alert classifier feature. In this feature, only the predicted true alerts will be 
displayed. Therefore, users will not be distracted with false alerts. The details of 
the false alert classifier are explained in the chapter 4. 
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Figure 3-19. The Real-time control panel. 
3.4.7 Interactivity, drill down and zoom 
One of the issues pointed out in usability studies is the user interactivity 
with the software. The author suggested various user interactions with the 
software, which can be categorized into interactions using the 3D images and 
interactions using the graphical user interface to aid the analysis. These 
interactions allow 'drill down' and 'detai l on demand' supports which follow the 
Shneiderman's visual information seeking Mantra [57]. The user can interact 
with the 3D images by using the VTK built-in mouse and keyboard interaction, 
such as pan, zoom and rotate. Users can get details about IP address, alert and 
attack signature, by picking the objects that represent them. In the timeli ne and 
plane views, the spheres represent IP hosts ; the signature ids represent the 
alert signature and the small cube on each line represents alert details. Picking 
an actor object can be activated by bringing the mouse pointer on to the object 
and then pressing the keyboard key, 'p'. A window containing the requested 
information will appear. 
In the parallel coordinates plot view, picking on where the line intersects 
the attributes axis will display the value of the attribute. In the scatter plot, 
picking the alert object will display the alert details. Figure 3-20 shows the 
example of a pop-up window after picking objects in the scatter plot view. 
Users can choose the monitoring period accordingly. A smaller 
monitoring period is preferred to avoid occlusions. This is because, when the 
alerts become numerous, the lines will congest the display and this will increase 
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the occlusions. Keeping the height of the time axis constant, and selecting a 
smaller monitoring period, will scatter the connection lines. The smallest 
monitoring period that can be chosen is one second. 
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Figu re 3-20. Examples of pop-up windows. 
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Another important interactivity feature is the abi lity to filter the alerts. The 
software allows the user to filter alerts according to the internet transport 
protocol, alert signature, alert class type, alert priority, source lP, destination lP, 
source port and destination port of the attacks. Users can also view and print 
the alerts listing and signatures listing in a selected monitoring period. These 
features can be accessed from the tools menu bar. Other information includes 
the quantity of alerts according to the source IP address, destination IP 
address, source port and destination port and users can plot a bar chart of 
these (Figure 3-21). These features can be accessed from the filter panel and 
are designed to provide the analysts tools that will help them to perform their 
tasks better. 
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Figure 3-21 : A bar chart of alerts received by the victim IP address in a 
specified period. 
3.4.8 The Graphical User Interface 
The graphical user interface was designed to help the user to perform 
monitoring , analysis and response tasks. In designing for an effective graphical 
user interface, Nielson [58] suggested the design should be simple, clear and 
address the user tasks. Edward [59]. on the other hand, suggested the use of 
common sense to design a graphical user interface. The common sense or 
heuristic ru les include clear design, use of user language, simple layout and 
addressing the user tasks. 
The user interface was designed by analysing the user tasks and from 
that the graphical user interface structure was proposed as in the Figure 3-22. 
The structure divides the tasks using three main designs which are the menu 
bar, notebook panel and image interaction. The menu bar has two submenus 
which are the file and tools menus, while the notebook panel has five different 
panels which are: the overview, analysis, filter, real-time and classifier panels. 
Page 58 
MenuBar 
A1ertLlst 
P,int 
SignalureLisl 
PO. 
f-RHetCameril 
L CoIourSe1lino' 
Legend 
I I 
I NOlebook Panel I 
, 
Real-time 
, 
I Image InteraCliol'l I 
"'.- 11 Mo,.. 1 1 
'-----;---' L -,------' 
1 1 c .. .,., 
'---;-----' ~om 
,------"rr==-----, t : te 
Moo~oring 
Period 
TreePanel 
sJoo 
Signalure 
ClilssiflCation 
Destina\lOll 
Source Por1 
Destinalioo Port 
Classifer 
Oplion 
-
.,,,"" 
Hide 
false alerts 
Figure 3-22. The graphical user interface structure. 
The overview panel is used for controlling the 3D AlertGraph. The 
analysis and filter panels are to help the user analysis tasks. The real-time 
panel is used for monitoring tasks. The response tasks are assisted by the 
save-image, alert-signature listing and printing features. The colour setting and 
the classifier menus are for the software settings. The colour setting is used to 
change the colour setting of the visualisation, such as the background colour 
and the objects colours. The colour setting also acts as a colour legend. The 
classifier menu is to allow the user to configure the classifier and the alert 
reduction settings. 
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Figure 3-23. Some the GUI control panels, the colour settings and the alert 
listing. 
3.4.9 Alert Reduction and a False Alert Classifier 
Displaying thousands of alerts in the graphic display will slow down the 
associated computer. To solve this problem, an alert reduction algorithm which 
groups similar alerts is used. This technique has been used by Tedesco [60] to 
solve the alert flooding attack problem. Alert flooding attack is simulated 
intrusion attempts that the attacker creates to make the analyst become 
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deluged with false information. 
To reduce the number of alerts, alerts were grouped with the same 
source IP address , alert signature and destination IP address. Then, different 
objects were used to represent the grouped alerts. A cube is for an alert 
targeting the local host, while a sphere is for an alert originating from the local 
host. In alert reduction mode, the cube will be replaced by a cone and the 
sphere will be replaced by a cylinder. 
Alert Received 
by local host 
(Victim) 
Alert Caused by 
local host 
(Attacker) 
LJ •• Alert Reduction 
•• Alert Reduction 
Figure 3-24. Alert objects in scatter plot. 
With this alert reduction approach, large numbers of alerts can be 
displayed at a time. The author has tested the prototype software's ability to 
display up to 120,000 alerts in one display. According to Abdullah [61], 30 ,000 
to 35,000 networked computers such as at the Georgia Institute of Technology, 
USA receive an average of 50,000 alerts per day. This prototype is scalable to 
monitor such scale of networked computers and alerts. Another novel feature 
that the author have applied in the visualisation is the use of a machine learning 
classifier to classify alerts into false and true positive alerts. The details of this 
alert classifier are discussed in chapter 4. 
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the author has explained the main features of the 
visualisation approach starting from the visual design to alert reduction 
technique . The author has also explained the user needs analysis and some 
issues about network security visualisation . The scalability issue was addressed 
by introducing the 3D AlertGraph, the alert reduction , the false alert classifier 
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and fil ter option to overcome the problem of huge amounts of data. The author 
also carried out special arrangement of the network host as in 3.4.4 to allow 
many hosts to be displayed in the timeline and plane views. 
This visualisation approach attempts to displays the optimum amount of 
information to users. Many researchers have suggested there is limited 
information that human beings can process effectively. The limit is sti ll under 
study but the range within 7 to 9 pieces of information is a typical consideration 
[62). The piece of information could be a number, a line, a colour etc. The 
pieces of information that this visualisation displays are within the effective 
range that a human being can process at a time. Table 3-5 shows the 
information displayed in the visualisation prototype. In the Overview, five pieces 
of information were displayed using colour for alert priority or classification, 
three information on the X, Y and Z axis (time, destination lP, quantity) and a 
coloured sphere to represent source IP and destination port. The author also 
made the monitoring in real-time and in analysis to be easy by implementing the 
false alert classifier. 
Table 3-5. The information displayed in the visualisation prototype. 
Information Overview Scatter Plot Parallel Plot Timeline View 
View View 
1 The IP transport protocol - Yes Yes Yes 
used in the attack. 
2 The indicative time of the Yes Yes - Yes 
attack. 
3 The indicative quantity of Yes Yes Yes Yes 
alerts. 
4 Geographical location - Yes - -
5 Alert signature - Yes Yes Yes 
6 Alert priority I Classifier Yes Yes - Yes 
7 Attacker I victim machine Yes Yes Yes Yes 
8 Source Port - - Yes -
9 Destination Port Yes - Yes -
10 Attackers domain - Yes 
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Table 3-6 summarises the need analysis and the features of the 
visualisation prototype that addressed the user needs. The 3D AlertGraph, 
scatter plot view and real-time monitoring in the visualisation prototype 
addressed the monitoring tasks. The drill down, filters, alert animation, false 
alert classifier, multiple views and geographical clustering features addressed 
the analysis tasks. For response tasks, listing alerts and saving images are 
used to help the users in reporting the attacks. In general, this visualisation 
prototype has addressed all the issues in network security visualisation and the 
need analysis mentioned earlier. 
Table 3-6. The summary of needs analysis and the software features addressing the 
needs. 
Analyst Task Visualisation needs (see Visualisation features of the 
section 3.1) prototype 
Monitoring (reactive) 
- Monitoring all attack - Simple display - OvelView in 3D AlertGraph 
alerts - OvelView display - Real·time monitoring 
- Identifying potentially - Flexibility - Setting of local network 
suspicious alerts 
Analysis (proactive) 
- Analysing alert data - Filtering and interaction - Drill·down 
- Analysing other related - Exploration - Packet payload view 
data - Multiple data source and - Filtering 
- Diagnosing attack correlation - Flexible monitoring period 
- Multiple view and level of data - Multiple view option 
- Alert Animation 
- False Alert Classifier 
- Geographical clustering 
- Bar charts of alert quantity 
Response 
- Responding to attack - Save image - Alert listing and printing 
- Documenting and - Signature listing printing 
reporting attack - Save image in JPEG or BMP 
- Updating IDS - Flexible colour setting 
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Chapter 4: Integrating a False Alert Classifier with 
Network Security Data Visualisation 
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4.1 Introduction 
Overwhelming alerts are a well-known problem in a signature-based 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS), such as Snort. The alerts produced from the 
IDS may reach thousands or even ten of thousands daily and most of them are 
false [4, 5). The task to identify the true alerts is left in the hands of the analyst. 
As the quantity of the alerts is numerous, manual analysis is almost impossible. 
This becomes even worse when if there is a lack of expertise to identify the true 
alerts amongst the thousand of alerts received. 
Previous researchers studied this problem and proposed various ways to 
solve it. Some of the approaches were to develop an analysis tool to explore 
and examine the alerts such as SnortAlog (41), logparser [42) and ACID 
(Analyse Console for Intrusion Detection) (43). The drawbacks of these tools 
were that the analyst still needs to deal with the alerts individually, and most of 
the output displays are in text form. 
4.2 Related Work 
Some researchers have opted for visualisation techniques to tackle this 
problem. Current research in network security visualisation has grown and 
many display techniques have been explored. Some of the tools developed 
were NVisionlP (3), IDSRainstorm [7], SnortView [4], VisFlowConnect [63) and 
many others. In general, the main focus of visualisation software is to achieve 
visual patterns of the true alerts and to help the analyst to explore them. Even 
with the aid of the visualisation software, identifying the attack patterns is still a 
difficult task. This may be due to occlusion, or due to the numerous alerts 
crowding the visualisation display. 
One way to overcome overcrowding alerts is by reducing the numbers of 
alerts to ease the analyses. Lee (64) and Viinikka (65) employed statistical 
methods, such as Granger Causality Analysis and EWMA Control Charts to 
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remove alerts that formed the normal behaviour of the monitored network. 
Tedesco [60] used token bucket filter to limit the quantity of alerts in each alert 
category and monitoring window. Pietraszek [66] and Bloedorn et al. [67] 
employed machine learning techniques to classify alerts into false and true 
alerts and then removed the false one. In these methods though, the classified 
alerts were not visualised and they were still presented to the network security 
analysts in text form. The network security analysts then had to analyse these 
alerts manually. 
Bloedorn et al. [67] showed that the use of the C4.5 classifier algorith m 
with domain-knowledge (OK) successfully reduced the false alerts. In their 
implementation, the OK rules were directly provided by experts and labelled 
training samples. The use of these rules was to adjust the attributes selection 
during the tree construction so lower scoring attributes could be chosen if the 
OK rules suggested such preference. 
Alternatively, Pietraszek used the RIPPER algorithm to create 
associative rules that classified the alerts into false and true alerts [66]. RIPPER 
is a rule learning algorithm described by Cohen [68]. It is a propositionallearner 
designed for efficient performance on large and noisy datasets and therefore is 
a noise-tolerant algorithm. 
It was thought that, in their implementations, there were difficulties for the 
analyst to add new training examples to the classifier model and no 
visualisation aides were used. The author extended the use of the classifier in 
the visualisation tool by providing the user with the ability to add more training 
samples to the classifier model using the interactive visual display. So, the 
classifier would learn new examples of false and true alerts, and then build a 
new model from them. Lastly, the classifier result was used in the visualisation 
by colour coding the false and true alerts, or simply hides the false ones. The 
output in the visual form will make the analysis more effective. 
Some researchers have applied machine learning and data mining in 
intrusion detection. Axelsson [44] used a Bayesian classifier with visualisation to 
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build a new 10S. Recent work by Sandford [69] introduced a new network 
intrusion detection system based on a novel signature detection filtering 
mechanism with statistical summaries and data mining algorithms. This work 
differed from theirs as the author aim was not to develop a new 10S but a tool 
that would aid the analysis of the alerts produced by Snort 10S. 
The author approach combined the visualisation technique with a 
machine learning classifier. Therefore, the visualisation software could learn 
from the previous examples, and classify alerts into false and true alerts. 
Another advantage of this tool is that it could reduce the alerts in the 
visualisation display, as the software could filter the false positive alerts. 
4.3 Machine learning classifier 
4.3.1 Approach 
This approach used the classification tree algorithm as the machine 
learning classifier. The classifier will learns from the labelled training samples 
provided by the user and build a classifier model from it. As the objective was 
not to build a new classification algorithm, a decision tree learner provided by 
an open source machine learning module, Orange [70] was used. 
The classification tree learner in Orange is actually based on the C4.5 
classification algorithm [71], and, in default setting, provides the same result as 
in the C4.5 classification algorithm. However, the Orange classification tree 
does not use codes from C4.5 algorithms. As in 103 [72] and C4.5-based 
algorithms, the Orange classification tree learner also uses information entropy 
theory to measure the information gain and find the best attribute for the tree 
division. 
Add and edit support were also privided where users could add a new 
training sample to the classifier or edit the existing training sample. Users could 
access these features through a window after selecting the alert object in the 
visualisation display. To select an alert object, users should bring the mouse 
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pointer on to the alert object and then pressed the keyboard key 'p' . This is also 
known as 'pick object'. The block diagram of this procedure is in the Figure 4-1. 
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Figure 4-1 : The block diagram shows the classification tree and user interaction 
architecture. 
4.3 .2 Input Attributes 
The information used to teach the classifier was the source lP, source 
port, destination lP, destination port, alert class type, IP datagram length and IP 
protocol. Before sending the alerts to the classifier, they were processed into a 
general form. The source IP address and destination IP address were 
generalised to local or foreign hosts. For the source and destination ports, they 
were generalised into standard ports, ephemeral ports, unassigned ports or 
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unknown ports. Standard ports were the ports with port number less than or 
equal to 1024. Ephemeral ports were the port numbers between 1024 and 
4999. The unassigned port numbers, were the port numbers greater than or 
equal to 5000. An unknown port number was assigned when there was no 
information regarding the port number in the IDS alert data. All of the attributes 
were discrete attributes except for the IP datagram length, which was a 
continuous attribute. The objective of this generalisation process was to prevent 
the classifier from memorising a specific example in the training set rather than 
producing general predictive rules. 
Table 4-1: Summary of Classifier Input and generalisation. 
Alert attributes Generalisation Note (Input Type) 
Source IP address Local host (Discrete attribute) 
Foreian host 
Source port Standard If port number less than 1024 
Ephemeral If port number used is between 
1024 and 4999 
Unassigned If port number used is bigger than 
5000 
Unknown If port number used is unknown or 
unspecified 
(Discrete attribute) 
Destination IP address Local host (Discrete attribute) 
Foreian host 
Destination port Standard If port number less than 1024 
Ephemeral If port number used is between 
1024 and 4999 
Unassigned If port number used is bigger than 
5000 
Unknown If port number used is unknown or 
unspecified 
(Discrete attribute) 
Alert Classtype Class type as (Discrete attribute) 
specified by Snort 
IP Dataaram lenath Actual byte value (Continuous attribute) 
IP protocol UDP (Discrete attribute) 
TCP 
ICMP 
Reserve 
Other 
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4.3.3 Classification tree 
The classification tree algorithm used was the induction tree learner in 
the Orange module. In the Orange module, the classification tree could be 
either a decision or a regression tree. As in this case, the decision tree learner 
was used because the result of the classification would be in binary, which is 
either true or false. In a decision tree learner, the end leaf will be the attribute 
associated with the classification result, true or false. The internal nodes 
correspond to each value of its associated attributes takes. The decision tree is 
generated by a recursive loop of the learning element, and by splitting the best 
attributes that splits the training example into their proper class. 
A post-pruning (backwards pruning) was also applied to simplify the 
classification tree. Pruning is one of the techniques employed in machine 
learning to tackle overfitting. Overfitting is an event in which the algorithm 
memorises the training data, but fails to predict a new instance well in the 
future. 
4.3.4 Classification Accuracy 
The k-fold cross-validation technique [73] was used to measure the 
classifier performance. In this technique, the data set was divided randomly into 
k equal subsets. The classifier was then built from the (k-1) data subsets and 
tested against the remaining subset. This procedure was repeated k times with 
different training and test sets. The average performance measures from all 
tests were then calculated. The k value of 10 was chosen, as recommended in 
the literature. The standard machine learning performance scores calculated 
were the classification accuracy (CA), the Brier Score (BS) and the area under 
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (AUC). 
The performance scores terms and formulas are explained briefly below: 
• Classification Accuracy, CA: This measure calculates the ratio of 
the correct prediction by the classifier against the total number in 
the test. 
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• Brier Score, BS: A Brier score measures the accuracy of a set of 
probability assessments. It is the average deviation between 
predicted probabilities for a set of events and their outcomes, so a 
lower score represents higher accuracy. In Orange, BS is 
calculated as 
o averageL(t(x)- p(xW where: 
• x is a class, 
• t(x) is 1 for the correct class and 0 for the others, and 
• p(x) is the probability that the classifier assigned to 
the class x. 
• Area under the ROC curve: This statistical measure is popular in 
medicine. It is a discrimination measure that ranges from 0.5 to 
1.0. A rough guide for classifying the accuracy of a diagnostic test 
is the traditional academic point system: 
o 0.90-1 = excellent (A) 
o 0.80-0.90 = good (B) 
o 0.70-0.80 = fair (C) 
o 0.60-0.70 = poor (D) 
o 0.50-0.60 = fail (F) 
The classifier performance was measured using a training sample that 
consisted of 561 alerts. These alerts had been added manually to the classifier 
through Add/Edit training sample feature. As the dataset was a skewed class 
distribution where there were high numbers of false alerts and low numbers of 
true alerts, the training set was sampled with a balance number of true and 
false alerts. The training sample consisted of 273 false alerts and 288 true 
alerts. The performance scores and the confusion matrix were shown in Table 
4-2 and Table 4-3. 
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Table 4-2: Classifier Performance Scores 
CA BS AUC 
Scores 0.9857 0.0265 0.9892 
Table 4-3: Classifier Confusion Matrix 
Negative Positive 
(false) (true) Accuracy Precision Recall Predicted Predicted 
Negative a b 
(false) 267 6 in the 
training set (TN=0.9780) (FP=0.0220) 
Positive c d 0.9804 0.9792 0.9826 (true) 5 283 inthe 
training set (FN=0.0174) (TP=0.9826) 
A confusion matrix shows the predicted and the real classification count. 
Each row in the confusion matrix represents the classification category. The 
following terms are defined for a two-by two confusion matrix and the formulas 
used to calculate them are: 
• Accuracy: (a+d) . 
(a+b+c+d) 
• True positive rate, TP (Recalled, Sensitivity): _( d ). 
c+d 
• True negative rate, TN (Specificily): _( a ). 
a+b 
P .. d • recIsion: -( --) . b+d 
• False positive rate, FP: _( b ). 
a+b 
• False negative rate, FN: ( c ). 
c+d 
The result showed the performance scores of the classifier were 
excellent. The area under the curve (AUC) ROC and classification accuracy 
(CA) were above 0.9857. For the Brier score (BS), the score was 0.0265 which 
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showed high accuracy. In contrast, Table 4-3 showed the confusion matrix 
score and the achieved true positive (TP), true negative (TN), false positive (FP) 
and false negative (FN) rates. The result showed the classifier was not biased 
towards any class category in the training sample. The Table 4-8 shows the list 
of the training sample. 
4.3.5 Testing 
Finally, the classifier was tested with three weeks of alerts data from the 
DARPA 1999 dataset. The first week and the third week of the data did not 
contain any intrusions. The second week, however, contained some intrusions. 
During these 3 weeks, Snort produced 142871 alerts with 125955 alerts in the 
first week, 14230 alerts in the second week and 2686 alerts in the third week. 
By testing the classifier with the data from first and third weeks, the result 
showed the classifier effectively classified almost all alerts as false alerts. The 
summary of the results is given in Table 4-4. The results were excellent. The 
classifier wrongly classified nine alerts from 2686 alerts of the third week, and 
none for the first week. These results showed the classifier was excellent in the 
baseline condition where there were no intrusions. Actually, there should be no 
true attacks at all. However, analysing the nine wrongly-classified alerts showed 
that the destination hosts of the attacks were not from the local host. Therefore, 
the network administrator could easily classify them as false alerts. 
Table 4-4: The classification results of the first and the third week. 
Total Classified as Classified as % of detected false 
Alerts false true alert 
Weekt 125955 125955 0 100% 
Week3 2686 2677 9 99.66% 
To measure the classifier performance in the attack environment, the 
classifier was tested against the second week dataset. The classifier detections 
were compared with the attacks in the intrusions list (Table 5-1). The classifier 
performance was assessed by counting the number of its true detections. From 
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the intrusions list (Table 5-1), there were initially 43 attacks. However, as Snort 
missed some of the attacks, the available attacks left were 18. It was noted that 
five of the attacks were in the training sample. The author assumed it was 
appropriate to test the classifier with the dataset, as the parameters used to 
build the classifier model were in general form (section 4.3.2). There was no 
detailed information of the attacks available to the classifier such as IP address 
and port number. 
From the testing, the classifier detected 17 out of 18 attacks in the 
intrusions list. The author believes the result was excellent. Furthermore, the 
one wrongly-classified attack could still be identified with the help of 
visualisation. The author will show these in the next section. 
Table 4-5: Classifier detection table - The green lines were the attacks in the training 
sample and the orange line was the wrongly classified attack. 
ID Date 
1 08, 
08, 
3 08, 
4 09/0 
01l3~ 
StartTime Destination IP Name 
1:01:0 '.1110 i 
: : 
: : 
,,5( 
,,5( 
,,5( 
,1' 10 
72.1 ,114,50 
pod 
Iback 
Iback 
Iphl 
Isatan 
satan 
13 1. 13:07:17 72,(6, phi 
pod 
18 1172,16,112,50 
TRUE 
E 
E 
TRUE 
TRIJE 
The author also tested the classifier with alerts produced from Honeynet 
traffic between 1 st of April 2006 and 30th of April 2006, and the results are 
given in Table 4-6. The author noted that there were five alert samples from the 
Honeynet traffic in the training sample. The alerts were highlighted in yellow in 
Table 4-8 at page 85. 
The training sample signature IDs was also compared with the signature 
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10s from the Honeynet alerts (see Table 4-7). This was to ensure that alert 
signatures from the Honeynet alerts were minimum in the training sample 
signatures 10. The author found that only seven out of 34 signature 10s from the 
Honeynet alerts were in the training sample signature 10s. This suggests that 
the alerts were new and unknown to the classifier. From the results, the 
classifier detected true alerts in this environment with a 99.1 % detection rate. 
Sample alerts from Honeynet traffic can also be used to train the 
classifier. However, the traffic which is free from intrusions, is needed. This will 
give the samples of false alerts. 
Table 4-6: Classification results for the Honeynet traffic. 
Total Classified as Classified as % of detected 
Alerts false true false alert 
April 16521 149 16372 0.9% 
2006 
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Table 4-7: The quantity of alerts according to their alert signatures for April, 2006. 
4.4 Integrating the Classifier Output with Visualisation 
The outcomes from the classifier were applied to the visualisation 
software. The users were given the choice of either to apply the classifier or not. 
In the overview display (3~ AlertGraph), when the classifier is applied, the true 
alerts will be coloured in red to highlight the area of interest. In other views, the 
true alerts will be coloured in red, the false alerts will be coloured in blue and 
can also be hidden. 
Figure 4-2 shows a visual image of the classifier outcomes in the scatter 
plot view. Alerts in blue showed the false alerts. The image in Figure 4-3 shows 
there were no alerts which suggested there were no true alerts. The image was 
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visualised with filtering of the false alerts. The images are produced from the 
monitoring period Wednesday 17/03/1999 from 13:00 to 15:00 . 
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Figure 4-2: Visualisation with classifier and all alerts were displayed. 
~' ..... .... " .. ~ .... ., 
.. "" .. " ...... 
Figure 4-3: Visualisation with classifier and all false alerts were hidden. 
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Figure 4-4: Visualisation without applying the classifier. 
Figure 4-5: Visualisation with classifier and only the classified true alerts were 
displayed. 
The images in Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 were from the monitoring period 
Friday 12/03/1999 between 15:00 and 17:00. Figure 4-4 shows the visualisation 
without applying the false alert classifier. By looking at the image, it was difficult 
for the user to identify the true alerts in the image. However, when the classifier 
was applied and the false alerts were filtered, the attacks to the host 
172.16.114.50 became obseNable. The true attacks were coloured red in 
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Figure 4-5. 
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Figure 4-6 : These figures show the observation in the scatter plot (top) and the 
timeline view (bottom) without hiding the false alerts in the same 
monitoring period. 
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The images in Figure 4-6 and Figure 4-7 show another advantage of 
using the false alert classifier with visualisation . The scatter plot pictures in 
Figure 4-6 were the image with this classifier, but the false alerts were 
unfiltered. As the true alerts were coloured red and the false alerts were 
coloured blue, one could still identify the true alerts. However, the image in the 
bottom of Figure 4-6, shows the alerts in the timeline view and it was not easy 
to identify the true alerts in this image. When the false alerts were filtered after 
the false alert classifier had been applied, the pattern of the attacks emerged 
(image of the bottom of Figure 4-7). The monitoring period of the images was 
Thursday 11 /03/1999 between 13:00 and 15:00. 
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Figure 4-7: These were the images after applying false alert classifier and 
hiding the false alerts. 
The pictures in Figure 4-8 show the different views before and after 
applying the classifier in the scatter plot view with geographical location. 
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Figure 4-8: Images from the scatter plot with geographical location before (top) 
and after (bottom) applying the classifier. 
In the situation where the classifier wrongly classified the attack as 
mentioned in the previous section, the visualisation could help to point out this 
event. An attack that was wrongly classified was attack number 5 as in the 
Table 4-5 at page 74. In the 3D AlertGraph, the attack number 5 was 
highlighted in red as it had a high number of alerts in the time interval. 
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Figure 4-9: Showing the occasions where the classifier wrongly classified the 
attack. 
4.4.1 Real-time Monitoring 
The false alert classifier can also be applied with real-time monitoring. If 
the false alert classifier option was cr05en , the alert received would go through 
the classifier to predict the category of the alert before being visualised. The 
software would display the true alerts and filter the false ones according to the 
user settings. With this function users could directly identify the true alerts as all 
alerts displayed were the true alerts. As there were some internal procedures 
involved to visualise the alerts, the users should expect a delay of between 3 to 
20 seconds before getting new alerts to be displayed. This delays also 
depending upon hardware performance of the system. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The author has shown that a decision tree classifier could help the 
analyst to identify true alerts and allow a pattern of true alerts to emerge in the 
visualisation. As the classifier did not remove the false alerts, the analyst could 
analyse them, if it was felt necessary. As a matter of fact, they could provide the 
classifier with new samples and updated the classifier model. 
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In summary, this work incorporated into the visualisation method a false 
alert classifier that helped users to identify the real alerts. The classifier used a 
decision tree learner and built a classifier model from seven alert attributes that 
had been generalised. The outcome was visualised with a different alert colour 
and the false alerts could be hidden. A utility has been created to help users to 
add new training samples into the classifier model. The classifier has been 
tested with the DARPA1999 dataset and a month of data from Honeynet traffic. 
The results showed the classifier performed well and helped the analysts to 
identify the real alerts. 
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Table 4-8: The training sample lists. The yellow area shows alerts from the Honeynet 
data. 
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Chapter 5: The Simulation Analysis 
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This chapter explains the simulation analyses to test the visualisation 
prototype software. The method and the dataset used are described. The 
examples of known attacks and simulated intrusion attempt are also explained. 
5.1 The simulation framework 
To test the usefulness of the prototype software, the author evaluated it 
in two different scenarios. In the first scenario, the prototype was tested using 
off-line traffic from the DARPA 1999 dataset and Honeynet traffic data from the 
High Speed Networks laboratory. The second scenario used real-time traffic in 
an experimental setting with an attacker machine injecting intrusion traffic into 
the network. 
MyS L Server 
Hub 
Visualisation Prototype 
L---H Tcpdump 
file 
Figure 5-1 : The off-line software evaluation - scenario 1. 
In the first scenario, the dataset [74] used was the dataset created by 
The Information Systems Technology Group (1ST) at the Lincoln Laboratory, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) . The project was carried out under 
Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force 
Research Laboratory sponsorship. The dataset was collected and distributed for 
evaluation of computer network intrusion detection systems. The project had 
distributed two evaluation datasets known as DARPA1998 and DARPA1999. In 
this study, the author used only the DARPA 1999 dataset. 
The dataset contained five weeks of Tcpdump traffic. Traffic from the first 
week and the third week did not contain any intrusions while the second week 
contained intrusions. The intrusion events in the second week were labelled so 
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the researchers knew what the intrusions were and when the events occurred. 
In analysing the dataset using Snort lDS, the Snort 10S had missed some of the 
intrusions. Thus any alert on those attacks was not received. Table 5-1 shows 
the intrusions list with the attacks detected by Snort are highlighted in yellow. 
The author noticed that the events in the dataset appeared five hours late. This 
is because the timestamp was converted to a local Coordinated Universal Time 
(UTC) time setting which was the London time used by Snort. 
Table 5-1: Intrusions list for the second week of DARPA 1999 dataset. 
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Another set of data for this study was taken from the Honeynet traffic 
data generated by the High Speed Network research lab in the Electronic and 
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Engineering department, Loughborough University. Two months of data from 
01 /03/2006 to 30/04/2006 were visualised and studied. The off-line Tcpdump 
datasets were examined using Snort IDS with alerts logging to the MySOL 
database. The signatures and rules used in the Snort IDS were obtained from 
the Snort community group (www.snort .org). 
(I ~ 
MySQ Server 
S rt 
H b 
Visualisation prototype 
Metasploit machine 
Figure 5-2: The real-time software evaluation - scenario 2. 
In the second scenario, the setting was as shown in Figure 5-2. In this 
setting, an attacker machine was added into the network. The attacker machine 
was a machine with Metasploit Framework 3.0 software installed. Metasploit 
Framework software (www.metasploit.com) is an open source development 
platform for creating security tools and exploits. The software is used by 
network security professionals to perform penetration tests; system 
administrators to verify patch installations; product vendors to perform 
regression testi ng ; and security researchers. In this scenario, the Snort IOS was 
set with alerts logging to the MySOL database and the real-time monitoring was 
performed in the visualisation prototype. Then, some exploits were run and the 
visualisation display was obseNed. 
5.2 Samples analyses 
To analyse the dataset using this visualisation prototype, some basic 
Page 89 
approaches to identify the anomalous alerts were followed. Firstly, the alerts 
were displayed in the 3D AlertGraph view and then in the scatter plot view. In 
the 3D AlertGraph view, the focus was on the area where there were many 
alerts in the time interval and the area with colour red or other colours except 
blue. 
In the scatter plot view, the focus was on irregularity alert flows, because 
the irregularities were normally caused by abnormal system behaviour [65]. The 
irregularities could be identified in the visual display either by a host: 
- having very few alerts 
- having too many alerts with different signatures 
- was the source of attacks. 
When suspecting a suspicious alert, the alert details were examined and 
the alert priority and the packet payload were used to understand the alert 
cause. Then, try to view it in the other displays and use the filter options to 
confirm and to corroborate the abnormal behaviour. 
5.2.1 Ntinfoscan and Pod DOS 
An observation on Monday 8 March 1999 between 13:00 to 14:00 GMT 
from the DARPA1999 dataset showed there were some suspicious events that 
needed further attention. Figure 5-3 shows the images from two different views. 
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Figure 5-3 : The top image shows various attacks to local hosts in the 
geographical view. The lower image shows the attacks after false alert 
filtering in the timeline view. 
The top image in Figure 5-3 showed there were various attacks from the 
same source targeting the same destination at the start of the observation and a 
few minutes later. These were shown as yellow lines which referred to the Tep 
protocol. Other suspicious events were the continuous attacks using the UDP 
protocol (blue lines). Then, there were attacks with an unknown protocol which 
were coloured in green with a high alert quantity bar. 
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When analysing the first group of alerts, the attacks could be assumed 
from a unique source targeting a unique host, using the TCP protocol and 
occurring roughly at the same time but with a different alert signature. 
Visualising in the signature class type revealed the signature class types were 
"attempt-recon", "misc-attack", "web-application-activity" and "web-application-
attack". Analysis from the packet payload of the alerts showed that these were 
perl command scripts launched by the external host at the targeted host. 
Therefore, there were grounds to suspect the alerts were true alerts. From the 
dataset intrusions list (Table 5-1) , the multiple attacks from the same source 
and destination were "Ntinfoscan" attack. The "Ntinfoscan" were used by the 
attacker to the targeted machine to gather information such as services, login 
and file system details. 
From the analysis of the packet payload of the attacks a few minutes 
later, the author found that the attacks were caused by the 'fpcount.exe' script. 
'Fpcount.exe' is the Microsoft FrontPage common gateway interface (CGI) 
script to count visitors accessing a web page. The continuous attacks using the 
UDP protocol (blue lines) were the 'SNMP Public Access UDP' and 'SNMP 
request UDP'. These alerts are classified by the classifier as false alerts. 
Meanwhile, the attack using an unknown protocol and having many alerts 
may also indicate suspicious events. Details of the alert showed the attack was 
using an unknown computer port and the packet payload contained a series of 
'0 ' hexadecimal values. As the computer port was unknown, and the packet 
payload was a series of '0' hexadecimal values, there were good grounds to be 
suspicious. From the alert signature, the attacks were a DOS attack. 
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Figure 5-4: The yellow bars highlighted attacks using unknown destination port 
in 3D AlertGraph. 
From the intrusions list (Table 5-1) of that day, it appeared that 
"Ntinfoscan" and Pod DOS attacks did happen, and the visualisation was able 
to direct attention to these attacks. Moreover, the visualisation prototype allows 
the users to understand better the information and gives access to detailed 
information of the attacks. The detailed information of the alerts and traffic are 
essential to determine the true and false alerts. 
5.2.2 Portsweep 
Figure 5-5 shows another example of analysis. The display in the 3D 
AlertGraph for 24 hours period, starting from 13:00 Monday 9 March 1999, 
highlighted a continuous horizontal red spheres and a high quantity of alerts at 
the beginning hours of the monitoring. The details from the pick object revealed 
that, at the red spheres area, there was a unique host attacking a unique local 
host using multiple destination ports. This was an indication of a portsweep 
attack. Then , in the first high quantity alerts (Figure 5-5), the attacks were from 
the same previous host attacking the same local host, but using a unique 
destination port number 7. The second high quantity alerts, about one and a 
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half-hours later, were attacks to the same local host using http port 80. 
The observation in the parallel coordinates plot view, on Monday 9 March 
1999 between 13:00 to 14:00 GMT from the dataset, showed there were lines 
covering the entire destination port axis (see Figure 5-5). The attack list showed 
the particular machine was under a portsweep attack. This confirmed the 
observation in the previous 3D AlertGraph view. 
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Figure 5-5: Portsweep Attack - The upper left picture is the 3D AlertGraph that 
shows the area of portsweeps and high quantity of alerts. The upper 
right picture shows the display of the pop-up window and green 
transparent layer highlighting the IP address 172.16.114.50. The 
bottom left picture is from the parallel coordinates plot that confirms the 
portsweep attack. The bottom right is the data in the timeline view. 
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The image in the timeline view revealed more information. The Snort IDS 
detected four attacks from attacker host, 153.37.134.17 to victim host 
172.16.114.50. The alert signatures were ' ICMP ping nmap (id=42) ', 'scan fin 
(id=43) ', 'TCP portscan (id=44), and 'portscan open port (id=45) '. 
5.2.3 Slammer worm 
The slammer worm is a self-propagating malicious code that exploits the 
vulnerability in the Resolution Service of Microsoft Sal Server 2000 and 
Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) 2000. It attacks port 1434 using the UDP 
protocol. An observation of a day (07/04/2006) from the Honeynet traffic 
showed there were attacks by the slam mer worm to the Honeynet. 
Observation in the 3D AlertGraph on that day showed there were a 
constant number of alerts in each interval for the whole period attacking the 
same destination port 1434 to the multiple hosts. The two upper pictures in 
Figure 5-6 show the view in the 3D AlertGraph. The bottom picture in Figure 5-6 
is the picture from the scatter plot view. From that picture, there were three 
attacks with alert signature ID of 180, 181, 182 and all the attacks used the 
UDP protocol. The total alerts for that period was 1354. Details of the three 
signature IDs showed the attacks were related to the MS-Sal worm which was 
a slam mer worm. Other attacks were with signatures 42,184 and 216. Further 
investigation showed the signature alert 42 was ICMP NMAP ping . The 
signature 216 was an oversize uniform resource indicator (URI) request to http 
port 80. Signature 184 was an ICMP destination unreachable. The advantage of 
using the scatter plot view was that the attacks were clustered according to the 
destination host and the attack signature. This means the attacks were grouped 
and easy to analyse. 
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Figure 5-6: A day image of Honeynet alert data in 3D AlertGraph (upper) and 
scatter plot view (bottom). Signature 180, 181 and 182 show the 
Slam mer worm attacking the local hosts. 
5.2.4 Real-time Monitoring 
To test the real-time monitoring of the prototype software, the scenario as 
in Figure 5-2 was set. Snort IDS was run on one machine in promiscuous mode 
with the alert logging to the MySQL database server. On the other machine, the 
visualisation software was set in the real -time monitoring mode with the false 
alert classifier turned on. By using metasploit framework 3.0 software, some 
attacks were launched to a computer in the network. The objective of this 
experiment was to observe the visualisation prototype effectiveness in the real-
time monitoring. 
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In the real-time monitoring, the visualisation display is either in timeline 
view or scatter plot view. In both visualisation displays, the users have choices 
either to switch on the false alert classifier and filter the false alerts, or to display 
all alerts with the Snort alert priority using colour-codes. In the test, a machine 
in the network was first attacked by NMAP and then by a TCP Overflow attack. 
The visualisation prototype displayed both attacks within a second after the 
attacks were launched. It was concluded the visualisation prototype was able to 
display the attacks in the network within seconds of the attacks, if Snort 10S 
detected the attacks. 
5.3 Conclusions 
The off-line traffic analysis and the real-time monitoring scenarios 
showed the prototype visualisation software was able to direct analyst attention 
to the potential intrusion attempts. The visualisation prototype also allowed the 
analyst to view archive data and display the alerts in different views. Combining 
the false alert filter and the visualisation also helps the analyst to identify the 
true alerts. The visualisation prototype also allowed the user to access detail 
information about the alerts almost immediately including the packet payload 
information. The observation in 3D AlertGraph also revealed that there might be 
• True attacks when there were high numbers of alerts in a specific 
interval. 
• A portsweep attack when there was continuous horizontal red or 
other colours except blue in a particular host. 
• A worm propagation when there were a constant number of alerts 
in many hosts throughout the monitoring period using the same 
destination port number. 
It was concluded that the prototype could usefully direct the user's 
attention, and would also give better understanding of the attacks. 
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Chapter 6: User Evaluation of the Network Security 
Alerts Visualisation Tool 
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6.1 Introduction 
Network security attack visualisation is a fairly new area of research and 
there are not many reports on user evaluation. Even in the subject of 
visualisation in general, few papers on visualisation applications or techniques 
reported their findings on user evaluation (75). Furthermore from 12 studies that 
had user evaluation, Ellis [75) reported that two were flawed, five were 
problematic, one was an informal study, two were foregone conclusions and 
only two could be considered successful. These show that conducting user 
evaluation is not an easy process. 
Despite that, the author believes evaluating network security visualisation 
tools is important, especially with human subjects. It is important because 
visualisation itself is about the representations of abstract data on the computer 
screen which the user has to interpret, and to make sense of the visual coded 
images. Moreover, the objective of most visualisation tools is to help users 
solve specific tasks, or have a bigger picture of the abstract information. 
Therefore, evaluating visualisation tools with their intended users plays an 
important part in measuring the tools effectiveness. 
However, conducting user testing is somewhat challenging. First, to 
identify the real-world users or close to the real-world users of the intended 
visualisation tools were needed, rather than heavily rely on student participants. 
To find real-world users is difficult, and if it is found, he or she is normally a busy 
person. 
The user evaluation is also time-consuming. The users have to 
familiarise themselves with the tools before conducting the test. The time 
needed for the training also varies from one participant to another, as each 
human has different ability to absorb and learn new information. As the 
prototype is only available on a single machine, the test has to be conducted in 
a one-to-one session, rather than in a group. Thus, it needs a lot of time. 
Another challenge faced is to test the prototype in the real environment. 
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As the prototype does sniffs of the network traffic, it may violate the IT 
networking policy of some organisations. Most organisations are reluctant to 
allow such tests. Despites these challenges, an acceptable evaluation of the 
visualisation tool must be found. 
6.2 Current Evaluation Practices in Information Visualisation 
Plaisant [76] summarised reports from a survey of literature of fifty user 
studies on information visualisation systems. From the study, the authors found 
four categories of user evaluation: 
- Controlled experiments comparing design elements. The studies in this 
category might compare specific widgets, or GUls, or compare mapping 
information to graphical displays. 
- Usability evaluation of a tool. These studies might provide feedback on 
the problems users faced with a tool and show how designers went on 
to refine their design. 
- Controlled experiments comparing two or more tools. This is a common 
category of user evaluation study. For example, the comparison studies 
of three tree visualisation tools: SpaceTree, Hyperbolic and Window 
Explorer by [77]. Those studies usually try to compare the novel 
technique with the current technique. 
- Case studies of tools in a realistic setting. This is the least common 
category. The advantage of case studies is that they report on users in 
their natural environment doing real tasks, demonstrating feasibility and 
in-context usefulness. The disadvantage is that they are time-
consuming to conduct, and the results may not be replicated and 
generalised. 
In usability evaluation, one popular technique is heuristic evaluation as 
proposed by Nielsen [58]. Heuristic evaluation is a usability evaluation method 
for computer software that helps to identify usability problems in the user 
interface design. The heuristic method consists of checking the software or tool 
against the standard usability principals, such as realistic user interface design, 
system status, user control and freedom, consistency, flexibility and ease of 
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use. It is low cost in terms of time, since it can be completed quite quickly. 
According to Neilson [78], only 3-5 evaluators are needed to identify 75-80% of 
all usability problems. 
For network security visualisation tools, the works by Conti [79], Abdullah 
[61] and Komlodi [80] reported their user evaluation. Komlodi and others [80) 
used heuristic evaluation and focus group usability testing of their prototype 
named as IDtk (intrusion detection toolkit). From the study, they identified some 
usability problems in their visualisation tool. The summary of the problems are: 
- The problem of using three mouse buttons to achieve rotational 
movement and zoom the 3D display to understand the data. 
- Users getting lost in the 3D display by over-zooming or over-panning, a 
typical problem' of 3D spaces. In these cases, there is no visual home 
position for the user to get back to the initial position. 
- Users complaining that, after they exerted much effort to achieve a 
satisfactory view, then they are not able to save views in a history, or to 
mark certain views as default views to which they could return. 
In this tool, the first usability issue found by Komlodi was addressed by 
applying the visualisation tool kit (VTK) zoom, rotate and pan default features 
with speed control. The user can choose to zoom or to rotate at a slow speed 
by bring the mouse control near to the centre of the image before zooming or 
rotating. The nearer the mouse cursor to the centre, the slower will be the 
motion. In VTK, the left button is for rotating, the right button is for zooming and 
the middle button is for panning. The zoom-in and zoom-out features depend on 
the mouse cursor position on the screen. Zoom-in is when the mouse cursor is 
on the upper area of the screen and zoom-out is when the mouse cursor is on 
the lower area of the screen. 
The second and third issues were addressed by adding a default visual 
home position and save image feature. With the default home position, the user 
can go back to initial position if they lost image orientation. These features can 
be assessed from the menu bar. 
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The work by Abdullah [611 involved a case study of the prototype, 
IDSRainstorm in a real world setting with real world users at Georgia Institute of 
Technology, USA. The network administrators there used this tool in their work 
and gave feedback to the developer. The feedback was gathered in the form of 
questionnaires and user ratings. There are between 30,000-35,000 networked 
computers operational at any given time at Georgia Institute of Technology. 
Some of the questions asked were: 
- About the user preference between using text logs and the visual tool. 
- About any missing information from the overall view that could have 
pointed the important events. 
- About the least useful or distracting features and the best features in 
the tool. 
The users were also asked to rate the tool according the following areas: 
- The information representation. 
- The zoom and pan features. 
- The mouse button features. 
- The comparison of using the tool with manual investigation 
- Was there enough information in the overview to get a general idea of 
network security alerts, identify alerts of interest and drill down for more 
detail. 
- Is the tool easy to use and to learn. 
On the other hand, Conti [791 evaluated their prototype effectiveness by 
addressing the key weaknesses of Ethereal7 to detect malicious traffic. The 
prototype was tested by a group of students who took a network security 
course. They were asked to perform certain tasks, and their responses were 
recorded to identify the ability to detect malicious activity in the playback traffic, 
the precision of the detection, and the time they took to perform the detection 
tasks. 
7 Ethereal is an open source network protocol analyser. 
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6.3 Evaluation Method 
Spence [81] describes information visualisation as a cognitive activity 
where users engaged with the potential gaining of an insight and understanding 
of the represented data. It involves perception and interpretation in the viewer or 
user's mind. The graphic in Figure 6-1 illustrates the information visualisation 
process. Therefore, evaluating information visualisation tools should not only 
address the human computer interaction (Hel) issues, such as the GUI and 
interaction, but must also include the understanding of the visual language. 
Assessment of the final objective of the visualisation tool, which is to help users 
to perform their daily tasks, should also be included. 
Data 
Image I Picture 
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We look at 
that picture 
and gain 
insight 
~e»= ~, -
0----------------------------0 
Information Visualisation 
Figure 6-1: Information Visualisation process. The graphically encoded data are 
viewed to form a mental model of that data. The picture was redrawn 
from [81]. 
To evaluate this visualisation prototype tool, the tool was tested with 
researchers at the High Speed Networks laboratory and network administrators 
at Loughborough University. All of them were familiar with intrusion detection, 
and have a good background in network security in general. Their participation 
in this study was voluntary, and they have never used this tool before. 
Before the evaluation session, the author showed them a quick 
demonstration of the prototype software, and they had some time to familiarise 
themselves with it. To test whether the users are gaining insight from the visual 
tool or not, they were asked to identify some true attacks to the network using 
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off-line data. The data used in this study was the DARPA 1999 dataset. The 
author asked them to interact with the visual image and to get the attack details, 
such as the attacker location, the IP address, and the attack types. The author 
also asked them to switch to different displays to get more insight and different 
perspectives of the data. The displays were: the overview, scatter plot view, 
parallel plot view, timeline view, plane view and world views. For each display, 
the author asked them to rate whether the visual display and design were 
intuitive and made sense or not. 
To check the usability of the tool in general, the participants were asked 
to give their rating according to the following questions using the Likert8 Scale 1 
to 5 with 1, for the most disagree, and 5, for the most agree: 
• Are the graphical user Interfaces (GUI) user-friendly? 
• Does the image interaction (pick actor) help users to get more 
information? 
• Does the false alert classifier help users to identify the true alerts? 
• Is the alert filter feature helpful? 
• Is it necessary to visualise the alerts in real-time? 
• Are the reporting tools such as saving the image in JPEG or BMP 
and alert listing helpful in preparing a network security report? 
• How do you rate this prototype software compared with other tools 
that you have used before? 
• Does this prototype software help you in performing network 
security tasks? 
At the end, the participants were asked to give their opinion or any 
suggestion to further improve this tool. In this evaluation, the author did not take 
any time measurement for the user to complete the task. This is because the 
author was not able to find any complete analyst software to compare the time 
with the visualisation tools. 
8 Likert Scale is a type of survey question where respondents are asked to rate the level at 
which they agree or disagree with a given statement. 
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During the user testing, the author was around to help the participant 
carries out the tasks when necessary. The author also discussed with them and 
noted down the areas where they felt there were usability problems. 
6.4 The Usability Report 
Following the Nielsen [78] findings, the usability test has been conducted 
with five participants. Even though the number of participants was small, the 
author managed to identify bugs9, usability problems and suggestions for further 
improvement. 
The bugs found were: 
• Image interaction was not functioning after the user pressed the 
'Stat' button in the filter panel. This happened because the module 
for plotting the bar chart was conflicting with wxVTK window. The 
wxVTK was the class responsible for displaying the visual. The 
author has fixed the problem by properly displaying the bar chart 
using wxFrame. 
• The pop-up window after the 'pick' actor was not functioning for 
some alerts. This was caused by the class responsible for 
decoding the data payload into ASCII. Sometimes, the data 
payload was unable to be decoded, and therefore raised a run-
time error. The author fixed the problems by making a control 
whether the data payload can be decoded or not before displaying 
the data payload in the text box. 
• The previous image displayed in the overview was not cleared up 
when the user started to visualise using the analysis panel or the 
filter panel. This is a minor problem and has been fixed. 
The usability problems found were: 
• Some users felt difficulty in controlling the 3D image movement 
using the VTK mouse control built-in features. This is due to lack 
9 Bug is a fault in a computer program that prevents it from behaving as intended. 
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of training. However, after several trials, they managed to control it 
correctly. One participant suggested a navigation control as in the 
'Google map' application could be used. The author suggests this 
feature in the future work. 
• The participants felt the overall GUI was fine except for the GUI in 
the analysis panel. They suggested a new organisation of the GUI 
to make it less crowded. 
• Another suggestion from the participants was to improve the 
interaction by displaying the mouse-over information when the 
user brings the mouse cursor onto an object. The basic 
information such as IP address, signature ID and time should be 
made available. The author agreed with this suggestion and the 
author will try to implement it in future work. 
In the user evaluation, apart from finding the usability problems and 
bugs, the participants were also asked to analyse a day of alert data which 
contained 1539 alerts. From the data, the participants were asked to list three 
local hosts that were under attack and to identify the one that was severely 
attacked using the time series 3D AlertGraph. All the participants successfully 
identified the local hosts, and the one that was severely attacked almost 
immediately. They agreed that the time series 3D AlertGraph was easy to 
understand, and easy to identify the potential true attacks in the network. The 
average rating given was 4.67 from the Likert scale, of 1 for very difficult, and 5 
for very easy. The standard deviation was 0.58. 
On the other views, the author also asked them to give their opinion 
whether the views were intuitive and made sense or not. The timeline and the 
plane views looked difficult to understand, with averages of 3.67 and 4.0 
respectively. The standard deviation was 1.53 for timeline view, and 1.73 for 
plane view. In other views, the average rating was 4.67, with a standard 
deviation of 0.58. These showed the visuals were intuitive and comprehensible. 
Lastly, the author asked the participants to evaluate the software on the 
following themes: 
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• Graphical User Interface design 
• Image interaction 
• False alert classifier feature 
• Filters features 
• Real-time feature 
• Reporting tools 
• Ability to perform network security tasks 
• General comparison with other or similar tools that they have 
seen. 
The participants were asked to give the rating, using a Likert Scale 1 to 5, with 1 
for the most dissatisfied, and 5 for the most satisfied. 
For the themes number C1 to C8 in Table 6-1, each average score was 
above 4.0, with a standard deviation less than or equal to 0.58. Table 6-1 
showed the average scores of the Likert Scale in each category. These were 
positive resu Its, and showed that this prototype had been successfully designed 
and addressed the needs of the user. 
Table 6-1: Analysis of user evaluation. 
no Averaqe Std dev 
AI Overview 4.67 0.58 
BI Scatter plot 4.67 0.58 
B2 Parallel plot 4.67 0.58 
B3 Timeline view 3.67 1.53 
B4 Plane view 4.00 1.73 
B5 Worldalobe 4.67 0.58 
B6 World plane 4.67 0.58 
Cl GUI - user friendly 4.33 0.58 
C2 Interaction 4.67 0.58 
C3 Classifier features 4.67 0.58 
C4 Filter features 4.67 0.58 
C5 Real-time 4.00 0.00 
C6 Reportina features 4.67 0.58 
C7 Comparison with similar tool na na 
C8 Perform Security tasks 4.67 0.58 
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6.5 Conclusion 
Conducting user evaluation is not the end process in software 
development. It should be a continuous process between the developers and 
the users. With these, the prototype software can be refined and meet the 
expectation of the industry. The author has fixed all the bugs found during the 
usability test, and the author has also implemented some of the suggestions by 
the users. However, the author reserved some suggestions for future work, due 
to the constraint of time. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Work 
Page 109 
7.1 Conclusions 
The difficulty in exploring and analysing large quantities of network 
security alerts in text form has inspired many researchers to use visual methods 
as an alternative. The author has discussed some of their methods and 
applications in chapter 2. This application, NSAViz used visual methods to 
explore and give an insight from large quantities of network security alerts data. 
This application differed from other applications, and used three new 
components and techniques which are:-
1. A novel time series 3D AlertGraph to overview the network security 
status, 
2. Multiple 3D visualisations in the scatter plot, parallel plot and timeline 
view for detail analysis, and, 
3. Integrating a false alerts classifier to help the user to identify the true 
attacks to the network. 
This application was designed with graphical user interfaces and user 
interaction features to help the analyses. The author has also addressed the 
main issues in security visualisation, and answered the research questions 
which are: 
1. To visualise network security information in a way that gives 
understanding of the data. From the usability study, it was shown the 
visual design was intuitive and easy to understand. 
2. To inform effectively the security status of the supervised network. 
The author has designed a novel 3D AlertGraph that gives a 
temporal outline of the attacks to the network. From the visual 
image, the user can understand and identify the potential true 
attacks to the network. 
3. To support large volumes of network security data and internet 
nodes. The 3D AlertGraph was designed to receive huge data, but 
for other views, filtering, alert grouping and smaller monitoring 
periods were allowed to reduce the quantity of information to be 
displayed. 
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4. To recognise the patterns of true attacks. By using a colour scheme 
and a false alert classifier, the possible true attacks to the network 
were able to be highlighted. 
5. To allow interactivity with the visualisation tool. The interaction using 
the graphical user interface and the visual objects allowed detailed 
information at a point of interest such as the source lP, destination 
IP and the details of the alert to be seen. 
6. To provide reporting tools in the visualisation application. The author 
has provided printing and saving features, such as the ability to print 
the alerts listing and alert signatures, and to save the images in 
JPEG and BMP formats. 
7.2 Research Contribution 
This thesis has described solutions for the problems outlined in the 
statement of the problem (see section 1.4) using visualisation methods. The 
author used the visualisation to represent network security attack data for 
effective exploration, monitoring and analysis. This thesis has provided the 
following main contributions in the area of security visualisation: 
• Designing novel 3D visuals of network security alerts for better 
viewing and understanding of network security alerts. The design 
of a 3D AlertGraph that gives a temporal outline of the number of 
alerts according to destination lP, source IP and destination port. 
This 3D AlertGraph is an extension of a 2D histograph plot into 
3D. The 3D scatter plot was designed for detail alert analysis. 
Other views include the 3D timeline view and parallel plot view. 
• Using a classification tree based on the C4.5 classification 
algorithm with visualisation to help users to identify the true alerts. 
This classification algorithm was integrated in each view, to 
provide a better visual pattern or highlight of true attacks. 
• Using animation, real-time monitoring, interaction, user-friendly 
graphical user interface, drill-down and filtering with the 
visualisation, to get a better insight of the network security alerts 
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data. 
7.3 Future Work 
From the usability study that was conducted, positive feedback was 
received from the users. The author plans in the future to incorporate the 
suggested improvements. The first suggestion was to allow pop-up information, 
such as IP address and alert signatures, to appear above the object when a 
mouse cursor passes over the visual object. The second suggested 
improvement was related to zoom-in, zoom-out and rotation of the 3D images 
using the mouse. The suggestion was to apply a navigation panel such as that 
in 'Google map'. At this moment, such controls use the three key mouse 
buttons, and it seemed difficult for the new user to control it. 
The author also plans to allow users to save some points of interest from 
the 3D AlertGraph, and then to use the saved information to be displayed in 
other views. Lastly, a greater scope of research can be conducted by upgrading 
this tool to be an Intrusion Detection System based on the visualisation method. 
The author mentioned previously that Snort missed some of the attacks from 
the DARPA 1999 dataset. With visualisation and integration of artificial 
intelligent techniques, it might be possible to resolve the problem of missed 
detection like in Snort. Currently, there is on going research on this subject, and 
there is still room for improvement. 
Page 112 
Bibliography 
[1] C. Brenton and C. Hunt, Mastering Network Security: Sybex, 2002. 
[2] S. K. Card, J. D. Mackinlay, and B. Sheiderman, Readings in Information 
Visualisation: Using Vision to Think. San Francisco, CA: Morgan 
Kaufmann, 1999. 
[3] T. Escamilla, Intrusion Detection: Network Security Beyond the Firewall. 
New York: John Wiley, 1998. 
[4] P. R. Keller and M. M. Keller, Visual Cues: Practical Data Visualization: 
IEEE Computer Society Press, 1993. 
[5] E. Maiwald, Fundamentals of Network Security. U.S.A: Mc Graw-Hill 
Technology Education, 2004. 
[6] M. A. Maloof, Machine Learning and Data Mining for Computer Security: 
Springer, 2006. 
[7] S. Russel and P. Norvig, Artificial Intelligent: A modern Approach. USA: 
Prentice Hall, 1995. 
[8] W. Schroeder, K. Martin, and B. Lorensen, The Visualization Toolkit An 
Object-Oriented Approach To 3D Graphics. USA: Kitware, Inc., 2004. 
[9] I. Sommerville, Software Engineering. USA: Addison-Wesley, 1995. 
[10] C. Ware, Information Visualization: Perception for Design: Morgan 
Kaufman., 2004. 
[11] I. H. Witten and E. Frank, Data Mining: Morgan Kaufmann Publisher, 
2000. 
[12] J. Zelle, Python Programming: An Introduction to Computer Science. 
USA: Franklin, Beedle & Associates, 2004. 
Page 113 
References 
[1] CompTIA, "Internet Security Threats Increasing in Maliciousness and 
Criminal Intent, CompTIA IT Study Reveals" Business Wire 2005 
Accessed Date: 30108/2008 
Available: 
http://findarticles.com/p/articies/mi mOEIN/is 2005 June 14/ai n1381216 
g 
[2] BBC, "Net security threats growing fast" BBC News - Technology 2004 
Accessed Date: 30109/2004 
Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3666978.stm 
[3] K. Lakkaraju, W. Yurcik, and A. J. Lee, "NVisionIP: netflow visualizations 
of system state for security situational awareness," VizSEGIDMSEG '04: 
Proceedings of the 2004 AGM workshop on Visualization and data mining 
for computer security, vol. Washington DC, USA, pp. 65-72, 2004. 
[4] H. Koike and K. Ohno, "SnortView: visualization system of snort logs," 
VizSEGIDMSEG '04: Proceedings of the 2004 AGM workshop on 
Visualization and data mining for computer security, vol. Washington DC, 
USA, pp. 143-147,2004. 
[5] J. B. Colombe and G. Stephens, "Statistical profiling and visualization for 
detection of malicious insider attacks on computer networks," 
VizSEGIDMSEG '04: Proceedings of the 2004 AGM workshop on 
Visualization and data mining for computer security, vol. Washington DC, 
USA, pp. 138-142, 2004. 
[6] S. K. Card, J. D. Mackinlay, and B. Sheiderman, Readings in Information 
Visualisation: Using Vision to Think. San Francisco, CA: Morgan 
Kaufmann, p. 7,1999. 
Page 114 
[7] K. Abdullah, C. P. Lee, G. Conti, J. A. Copeland, and J. Stasko, "IDS 
rainStorm: visualizing IDS alarms," VizSEC 05 IEEE Workshop on 
Visualization for Computer Security vol. Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA, pp. 
1-10,2005. 
[8] K. Nyarko, T. Capers, C. Scot!, and K. Ladeji-Osias, "Network intrusion 
visualization with NIVA, an intrusion detection visual analyzer with haptic 
integration," Proceedings of the 10th Symposium on Haptic Interfaces for 
Virtual Environment and Teleoperator Systems pp. 277-284, 2002. 
[9] R. F. Erbacher and D. Frincke, "Visualization in Detection of Intrusions and 
Misuse in Large Scale Networks," IV '00: Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Information Visualisation, pp. 294-299, 2000. 
[10] X. Vin, W. Vurcik, M. Treaster, V. Li, and K. Lakkaraju, "VisFlowConnect: 
netflow visualizations of link relationships for security situational 
awareness," VizSECIDMSEC '04: Proceedings of the 2004 ACM 
workshop on Visualization and data mining for computer security, vol. 
Washington DC, USA, pp. 26-34, 2004. 
[11] W. C. Graham, "Buckles: A Configurable Information Visualization 
System." 2007 Accessed Date: 21/01/2008 
Available: http://www.freshvista.comlWhitePaper.pdf 
[12] R. Ball, G. A. Fink, and C. North, "Home-centric visualization of network 
traffic for security administration," VizSECIDMSEC '04: Proceedings of the 
2004 ACM workshop on Visualization and data mining for computer 
security, vol. Washington DC, USA, pp. 55-64, 2004. 
[13] C. Ware, Information Visualization: Perception for Design: Morgan 
Kaufman., pp. 1-23,116-117, 2004. 
[14] R. F. Erbacher and D. Frincke, "Visual Behavior Characterization for 
Intrusion and Misuse Detection," VIII Proceedings of the SPIE '2001 
Conference on Visual Data Exploration and Analysis, pp. 210-218, 2001. 
Page 115 
[15] Snort, "Snort - the de facto standard for intrusion detection/prevention" 
Accessed Date: 20/11/2007 
Available: http://www.snort.org/ 
[16] S. Panjwani, S. Tan, K. M. Jarrin, and M. Cukier, "An experimental 
evaluation to determine if port scans are precursors to an attack," 
International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2005. 
DSN 2005. Proceedings, pp. 602-611, 2005. 
[17] S. Ansari, S. G. Rajeev, and H. S. Chandrashekar, "Packet sniffing: a brief 
introduction," Potentials, IEEE, vol. 21, pp. 17-19,2002. 
[18] A. Piskozub, "Denial of service and distributed denial of service attacks," 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Modern Problems of 
Radio Engineering, Telecommunications and Computer Science, pp. 303-
304,2002. 
[19] B. Harris and R. Hunt, "TCP/lP security threats and attack methods," 
Computer Communications, vol. 22, pp. 885-897, 1999. 
[20] C. Brenton and C. Hunt, Mastering Network Security: Sybex, pp. 435-435, 
2002. 
[21] T. Jawin, "RIP Routing Attacks" 2008 Accessed Date: 20/01/2008 
Available: http://www.jawin.com/networksecurity/RIPRoutingAttacks.htmI 
[22] E. Maiwald, Fundamentals of Network Security. U.S.A: Mc Graw-HiII 
Technology Education, pp. 67-70, 2004. 
[23] T. Bradley, "Introduction to Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)" Accessed 
Date: 30/08/2008 
Available: http://netsecurity.about.com/cs/hackertools/a/aa030504.htm 
[24] J. B. Kennedy, K. J. Mitchell, and P. J. Barclay, "A framework for 
information visualisation," SIGMOD Rec., vol. 25, pp. 30-34, 1996. 
Page 116 
[25] P. R. Keller and M. M. Keller, Visual Cues: Practical Data Visualization: 
IEEE Computer Society Press, p. 6, 20-21, 1993. 
[26] B. Wunsche, "A survey, classification and analysis of perceptual concepts 
and their application for the effective visualisation of complex information," 
APVis '04: Proceedings of the 2004 Australasian symposium on 
Information Visualisation, vol. Christchurch, New Zealand, pp. 17-24, 
2004. 
[27] Wireshark-Ethereal, Accessed Date: 30/08/2008 
Available: http://www.wireshark.org/ 
[28] CiscoSysytem, "Netflow" Accessed Date: 30/08/2008 
Available: 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6601/products ios protocol grou 
p home.html 
[29] Lancope, "StealthWatch" Accessed Date: 30/08/2008 
Available: http://www.lancope.com/products/stealthwatch-management-
console/ 
[3~] S. Lau, "The Spinning Cube of Potential Doom," Communications of the 
ACM, vol. 47, pp. 25-26, 2004. 
[31] Bro, "Bro Intrusion Detection System" 2005 Accessed Date: 25 Oct. 2005 
Available: http://bro-ids.org/manuals.html 
[32] J. McPherson, K.-L. Ma, P. Krystosk, T. Bartoletti, and M. Christensen, 
"PortVis: a tool for port-based detection of security events," 
VizSEGIDMSEG '04: Proceedings of the 2004 AGM workshop on 
Visualization and data mining for computer security, vol. Washington DC, 
USA, pp. 73-81, 2004. 
[33] P. Ren, G. Van, L. Zhichun, C. Van, and W. Benjamin, "IDGraphs: 
Intrusion Detection and Analysis Using Histographs," Proceedings of the 
Page 117 
IEEE Workshops on Visualization for Computer Security, pp. 39-46, 2005. 
[34] F. J. Dean and T. S. John, "The Information Mural: A Technique for 
Displaying and Navigating Large Information Spaces," vol. 4, pp. 257-271, 
1998. 
[35] S. Krasser, G. Conti, J. Grizzard, J. Gribschaw, and H. Owen, "Real-time 
and forensic network data analysis using animated and coordinated 
visualization," pp. 42-49, 2005. 
[36] G. Conti, K. Abdullah, J. Grizzard, J. Stasko, J. A. Copeland, M. Ahamad, 
H. L. Owen, and C. Lee, "Countering security information overload through 
alert and packet visualization," Computer Graphics and Applications, 
IEEE, vol. 26, pp. 60-70, 2006. 
[37] D. A. Keim, J. Schneidewind, and M. Sips, "CircleView: a new approach 
for visualizing time-related multidimensional data sets," AVI '04: 
Proceedings of the working conference on Advanced visual interfaces, vol. 
Gallipoli, Italy, pp. 179-182, 2004. 
[38] Y. Livnat, J. Agutter, S. Moon, R. F. Erbacher, and S. Foresti, "A 
Visualisation Paradigm for Network Intrusion Detection," Proceeding of the 
2002 IEEE Workshop on Information Assurance and Security, vol. United 
States Military Academy, West Point, NY, pp. 92-99, 2002. 
[39] K. Abdullah, C. Lee, G. Conli, and J. A. Copeland, "Visualizing network 
data for intrusion detection," Information Assurance Workshop, 2005. lAW 
'OS. Proceedings from the Sixth Annual IEEE SMC, pp. 100-108, 2005. 
[40] M. S. De-Silva, D. J. Parish, P. Sandford, and J. M. Sandford, "Automated 
Detection of Emerging Network Security Threats," ICN '07 Sixth 
International Conference on Networking, pp. 98-105, 2007. 
[41] J. Chartier, "SnortALog : Snort Analyser Logs" 2005 Accessed Date: 
August 2005 
Page 118 
Available: http://jeremy.chartier.free.fr/snortalog/index.html#sample 
[42] Microsoft, "Log Parser" Accessed Date: 20/11/2007 
Available: http://www.logparser.com/ 
[43] R. Danyliw, "The Analysis Console for Intrusion Databases (ACID)" 
Accessed Date: 20/11/2007 
Available: http://www.cert.org/kb/acid/ 
[44] S. Axelsson, "Combining a bayesian classifier with visualisation: 
understanding the lDS," VizSECIOMSEC '04: Proceedings of the 2004 
ACM workshop on Visualization and data mining for computer security, 
vol. Washington DC, USA, pp. 99-108, 2004. 
[45] G. Vert, D. A. Frincke, and J. C. McConnell, "A Visual Mathematical Model 
for Intrusion Detection," ProG. 21st {NIST}-{NCSC} National Information 
Systems Security Conference, p. 337, 1998 
[46] W. Yurcik, J. Barlow, K. Lakkaraju, and M. Haberman, "Two Visual 
Computer Network Security Monitoring Tools Incorporating Operator 
Interface Requirements" Proc. of the Workshop on Human-Computer 
Interaction and Security Systems (HCISEC 2003) 2003 Accessed Date: 
30108/2008 
Available: http://www.andrewpatrick.ca/CHI2003/HCISEC/hcisec-
workshop-yurcik-2.pdf 
[47] L. D. Paulson, "Researchers develop network-security visualization tools," 
Computer, vol. 37, pp. 17-18,2004. 
[48] A. Komlodi, J. R. Goodall, and W. G. Lutters, "An Information Visualization 
Framework for Intrusion Detection," CHI '04: CHI '04 extended abstracts 
on Human factors in computing systems, vol. Vienna, Austria, p. 1743, 
2004. 
[49] A. Dapos Amico and M. Kocka, "Information assurance visualizations for 
Page 119 
specific stages of situational awareness and intended uses: lessons 
learned," Visualization for Computer Security, 2005. (VizSEC 05). IEEE 
Workshop on, vol. Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA, pp. 107-112, 2005. 
[50] J. R. Goodall, "User Requirements and Design of a Visualization for 
Intrusion Detection Analysis," Information Assurance and Security (lAW), 
pp. 394-401, 2005. 
[51] R. F. Erbacher, K. Christensen, and A. Sundberg, "Designing Visualization 
Capabilities for IDS Challenges," Proceedings of the IEEE Workshops on 
Visualization for Computer Security, pp. 121-127, 2005. 
[52] P. Ren, "Ensuring the continuing success of vizsec," Proceedings of the 
3rd international workshop on Visualization for computer security, pp. 67-
70,2006. 
[53] MySQL, Accessed Date: 30108/2008 
Available: http://www.mysql.com/ 
[54] Python, Accessed Date: 30/08/2008 
Available: http://www.python.org/ 
[55] VTK, Accessed Date: 30108/2008 
Available: http://www.vtk.org/ 
[56] L. L. C. MaxMind, "MaxMind, GeolP" 2006 Accessed Date: 26 May 2006 
Available: http://www.maxmind.com/ 
[57] B. Shneiderman, "The Eyes Have It: A Task by Data Type Taxonomy for 
Information Visualizations.; In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on 
Visual Languages, pp. 336-343, 1996. 
[58] J. Nielsen and R. Molich, "Heuristic evaluation of user interfaces," 
Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing 
systems: Empowering people, pp. 249-256, 1990. 
Page 120 
[59) J. S. Edward and C. W. Douglas, "Effective user interfaces: some common 
sense guidelines," Proceedings of the 5th annual international conference 
on Systems documentation, pp. 87-94,1986. 
(60) G. Tedesco and U. Aickelin, "Data Reduction in Intrusion Alert 
Correlation," WSEAS Transactions on Computers, pp. 186-193, 2006. 
(61) K. Abdullah, "Scaling and Visualizing Network Data to Facilitate in 
Intrusion Detection Tasks," School of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering, vol. Phd, p. 59, 7 Apr. 2006. 
(62) K. C. Larson, M., "Web page design: implications of memory, structure and 
scent for information retrievaL," Proc. ACM Conf. on (CHI) Human Factors 
in Computing Systems, pp. 25-32, 18-23 April 1998. 
(63) X. Vin, W. Vurcik, and A. Slagell, "The Design of VisFlowConnect-IP: A 
Link Analysis System for IP Security Situational Awareness," IWIA '05: 
Proceedings of the Third IEEE International Workshop on Information 
Assurance, pp. 141-153, 2005. 
(64) W. Lee and X. Qin, "Statistical Causality Analysis of INFOSEC Alert Data," 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science - RA1D2003, vol. Volume 2820/2003, 
pp. 73-93, 2003. 
(65) J. Viinikka, H. Debar, L. Me, and R. Seguier, "Time series modeling for 
IDS alert management," ASIACCS '06: Proceedings of the 2006 ACM 
Symposium on Information, computer and communications security, vol. 
Taipei, Taiwan, pp. 102-113, 2006. 
(66) T. Pietraszek, "Using Adaptive Alert Classification to Reduce False 
Positives in Intrusion Detection," Lecture Notes in Computer Science -
RAID2004, vol. Volume 3224/2004, pp. 102-124,2004. 
(67) E. E. Bloedorn, L. M. Talbol, and D. D. DeBarr, "Data Mining Applied to 
Intrusion Detection: MITRE Experiences," Machine Learning and Data 
Page 121 
Mining for Computer Security, pp. 65-87, 2006. 
[68] W. W. Cohen, "Fast Effective Rule Induction," Proc. of the 12th 
International Conference on Machine Learning, pp. 115-123, 1995. 
[69] P. Sandford and D. J. Parish, "Identifying Abuse in ISP Networks" Oxford 
Internet Conference: Safety & Security in a Networked World 2005 
Accessed Date: 30/08/2008 
Available: 
http://www.oii.ox.ac.uklmicrosites/cybersafety/extensions/pdfs/papers/pete 
r sandford.pdf 
[70] J. Demsar, S. Zupan, and G. Leban, "Orange: From Experimental Machine 
Learning to Interactive Data Mining" White Paper (www.ailab.si/orange\. 
Faculty of Computer and Information Science, University of Ljubljana 2004 
Accessed Date: 30/08/2008 
Available: http://www.ailab.si/orange 
[71] J. R. Quinlan, C4.S: Programs for Machine Learning. Morgan Kaufmann, 
1993. 
[72] H. Ding and X.-K. Wang, "Research on algorithm of decision tree 
induction," Proceedings of International Conference on Machine Learning 
and Cybernetics, pp. 1062-1065 4-5 Nov. 2002. 
[73] R. Kohavi, "A Study of Cross-Validation and Sootstrap for Accuracy 
Estimation and Model Selection.," Proceedings of the Fourteenth 
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pp. 1137-
1143,1995. 
[74] L. L. MIT, "DARPA Intrusion detection evaluation dataset" 1999 Accessed 
Date: 20/11/2007 
Available: http://www.ll.mit.edu/IST/ideval/data/dataindex.html 
[75] G. Ellis and A. Dix, "An explorative analysis of user evaluation studies in 
Page 122 
information visualisation," Proceedings of the 2006 AVI workshop on 
BEyond time and errors: novel evaluation methods for information 
visualization, pp. 1-7,2006. 
[76] C. Plaisant, "The challenge of information visualization evaluation," 
Proceedings of the working conference on Advanced visual interfaces, pp. 
109-116, 2004. 
[77] C. Plaisant, J. Grosjean, and B. B. Bederson, "SpaceTree: Supporting 
Exploration in Large Node Link Tree, Design Evolution and Empirical 
Evaluation," Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Information 
Visualization (InfoVis'02), pp. 57-64, 2002. 
[78] J. Nielsen, "Heuristic Evaluation," Usability Inspection Methods, pp. 25-64, 
1994. 
[79] G. Conti, "Countering Network Level Denial of Information Attacks using 
Information Visualisation," College of Computing, vol. Phd, p. 183, 27 
March 2006. 
[80] A. Komlodi, P. Rheingans, A. Utkarsha, J. R. Goodall, and J. Amit, "A 
user-centered look at glyph-based security visualization," VizSEC 05 IEEE 
Workshop on Visualization for Computer Security, vol. Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, USA, pp. 21-28, 2005. 
[81] R. Spence, Information Visualization: Design for Interaction Harlow: 
Pearson/Prentice Hall, p. 5, 2007. 
Page 123 

